


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
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As the Editor Sees It

For the first time in our history, problems concerning education are of prime concern to the national government. Traditionally a matter for state and local handling, education has in the past two or three years invaded the halls of Congress. The barbed issue of racial discrimination has been solved, in principle, by the Supreme Court, but it continues to plague Congress in practice through its influence on other educational issues. This was particularly apparent last session in the juggling of the Kelley bill to provide Federal aid to education, where the Powell amendment would have denied such aid to states not racially integrated. Congress handled the whole issue on a strictly political basis and emerged without honor. Now in the new Congress, the same question will be brought up.

The idea of Federal aid to education is not new. There has been Federal assistance for vocational education for years, and of course the basic principle of land-grant colleges is as old as the government itself. But the idea of direct Federal grants for the support of public schools on the basis of need is a new development, brought forward because of the critical need for new buildings since World War II. There are many cogent arguments on both sides of the issue. The proponents of Federal aid point to the tremendous shortage of suitable classrooms; to the social responsibility of the nation to see that every child has an equal educational opportunity; and to the limited resources available to many states. Opponents insist that with Federal aid there comes inevitably Federal control; that education is by its nature a local problem, conditioned by local needs; that it is unfair to tax the people of one state to assist those in another state to solve a local problem; and that most of the poorer states could provide better education by abandoning the expensive segregated system.

It is our belief that Federal intervention in the field of elementary and secondary education should be avoided as long as possible. Even strong state control often brings undesirable effects in local school districts, but this at least should be the limit of authority. In many states the support of schools could be immensely aided by a revision of the tax system, so that the weight falls upon the state's actual sources of income, rather than on non-revenue producing homes. There are many areas where housing developments contain two or three children per home, while the taxes on that home, the main support of education, are insufficient to pay for the schooling of even one child. Not Federal aid, but tax revision, is the next step needed.

But we do believe there is a needed and justifiable area for Federal aid at the college level. One way this could be utilized would be through Federal grants to colleges to be used to augment their scholarship aid for qualified applicants. Then too, as is abundantly evident, there will be many more applicants for college in a few years than can possibly be accommodated. The Federal government itself employs thousands of technicians, engineers, scientists and other professional people in its constitutional activities. Would it not be possible, through the same reasoning that permitted the establishment of academies to train military and naval officers, to have Federal colleges for the training of professional personnel to staff its other departments? Such institutions would do a great deal to relieve the growing pressures on private and state universities and so give many young people an educational opportunity that otherwise will certainly be denied them. Here is an area of Federal aid that can help the whole nation equally, and would yet be directly associated with Federal functions, rather than local. We think it merits consideration.

Some Reflections Upon the Study of English History

LEO F. SOLT

Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

In a little book entitled *This Thing Called History* (p. 22), Harold Wheeler reported that Sir Robert Walpole, upon his sick bed, once called for a novel to read. "Bring me something that is true," he muttered; "not history for that I know to be a lie." The problem of truth in history is closely related to the general approach that the historian takes to his subject. For instance, does he think of himself primarily as a scientist or as an artist? The answer supplied by Morris Cohen gives us considerable insight into the historical method (*The Meaning of History*, p. 34). History, said Cohen, is an imaginative reconstruction of the past which is scientific in its determinations (facts) and artistic in its formulations (interpretations).

The relationship of scientific facts to artistic interpretations is one of the most difficult problems facing the historian. When I was an undergraduate, we were constantly being cautioned in history classes not to let the individual trees obstruct our view of the forest. Today we have overcome some of our fears about a strictly factual approach to history and are a little more concerned with a tendency by some to overgeneralize. A happy combination of both seems to be the best solution. "Be not like the empiric ant which merely collects, nor like the cobweb-weaving theorists who do but spin webs from their own intestines; but imitate the bees which both collect and fashion" (G. O. Sayles, *The Medieval Foundations of England*, p. vii).

There are some people, however, who contend that the function of history is primarily scientific, i.e. to establish laws which invariably hold true. If this is so, we might well ask what are the laws? In his essay "Law in History," E. P. Cheyney enumerated some six laws of history, one of which was a law of progress (*Law in History and Other Essays*, pp. 1-29). The

totalitarian regimes of our own age have put this so-called "law" to rout. According to H. A. L. Fisher, "the fact of progress is written plain and large on the page of history; but progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next. The thoughts of men may flow into channels which lead to disaster and barbarism" (*A History of Europe*, I, ix).

One of the great difficulties of attempting to find laws in history is the impossibility of finding all of the relevant facts which are either unknown or irretrievably lost. Still another difficulty in establishing historical laws (assuming, of course, the improbability that man's free will and his emotions ultimately can be reduced to predictable behavior) is the impossibility of laboratory experiments. This is due to the presence of too many variable factors which cannot be isolated and controlled. Some have thought, for example, that you could run a controlled experiment on Puritanism in Old England by examining the phenomenon of Puritanism in New England. Unfortunately, this is impossible, for at once a new problem, among others, arises, and that is the unique influence of the frontier which changes the entire character of Puritanism in New England through secession and expansion.

Just as it is wrong to stress the role of historical laws as universal propositions, so it seems improper to oversimplify the uniqueness of particular events. After a lifetime of study Fisher made this confession.

Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact with

respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen (*op. cit.*, I, ix).

There are always elements which are unique to a particular person, situation, or nation, which should not be minimized. History is always supplying the exception to every rule. However, the absolutely unique event which has no element in common with anything else, according to Cohen, is impossible to describe, for categories are necessary for intelligible discourse. He suggests examination of the unique event of King John's signing the Magna Charta at Runnymede on June 15, 1215.

Neither the individual John, the date, nor the specific act will occur again. Yet our statement identifies John as one of a class, the kings of England, who are defined as the occupants of certain offices or as bearing certain relations to the various elements of the people of England. Magna Charta is significant as one of a number of political documents; and not only is the physical act of signing repeatable, but the motives which we assume compelled John to do it are recurrent ones in human experience. The date itself denotes a unique or unrepeatable state of the world, but note that it is defined in terms of a number of repeatable intervals, namely years (*op. cit.*, p. 84).

No one, of course, can deny the unique importance of Henry VIII, Oliver Cromwell, William Pitt, William Gladstone, or Winston Churchill. What the great-man historian fails to realize is that great men very often symbolize some large movement. Henry VIII, for example, who was motivated to a great extent by personal reasons in his relations with the Papacy, nevertheless embodied a great deal of anticlerical feeling in pre-Reformation England. The ready agreement of the unpacked Reformation Parliament to his proposed religious changes, and its vehement opposition to his fiscal measures, is verification of that embodiment.

In steering his course between the universal and the unique the historian should attempt to relate where we have been; he should try to find out why we are where we are now. In doing

this he should not seek knowledge of the past, just any knowledge, indiscriminately; nor should he seek knowledge only insofar as it has relevance to his own immediate world. The historian, it seems to me then, must have his sights on the world of the past *and* the present day world. He must have both *historic-mindedness* and *present-mindedness*. Like the ancient god Janus, he must be two-faced because he is pulled in two directions; he has two concerns: the "then" and the "now." But this ambivalence of direction is not always easy to maintain. The danger lies in the temptation to look in one direction to the exclusion of the other. In that event the historian may become either an antiquarian or a modernist.

The antiquarian studies the past for its own sake. He is intent upon digging up information irrespective of its importance or significance to our own age. He becomes a mere fact-grubber. How obese did Henry VIII become in his later years? Suffice it to say that his appetite for food paralleled his appetite for wives; one need not inquire into the mechanical contrivance that hauled him up and down stairs. The modernist studies only those things in the past that are important now. From this assumption he frequently reasons that the more recent the history the more important it becomes. Carried to its logical conclusion, it means studying only those items which are on the front pages of today's *New York Times*. With myopic vision the modernist becomes a specialist only in the world about himself, and finally, only a specialist in himself.

One of the great advantages of the two-directional approach to history I have been suggesting is the use of the priceless knowledge gained from our contemporary world to understand what happened in the past. But what is more important, such an approach gives us perspective and experience from the past to meet present day problems. It helps to develop breadth of judgment and tolerance, especially for conflicting points of view. But there is yet another way in which the historian's twofold basis (what was important to the people in the past *and* what is important now) can be used. Because history never repeats itself in exactly the same way, it is impossible, as we have seen, to find an historical situation in the present which exactly

corresponds to an historical situation in the past. Having recognized this, however, it does appear that certain patterns of a particular historical complex are analogous to other historical complexes. Sir John Neale said: "History never repeats itself, but it offers analogies."

Take the heroic age of Elizabethan England which Neale has characterized as so much like our own twentieth century (*Saturday Review of Literature*, October 1, 1955, p. 12). Then, as now, English national security was confronted with threats from an international organization whose universal claims jeopardized England's national survival. The "cold war" with Catholic Spain in Elizabeth I's day began with the Rebellion of the Northern Earls in 1569. The Queen, together with her chief minister, Lord Burghley, saw the problem, as some do today, in terms of power politics whereby *raison d'etat* was placed above *raison d'eglise*. This attitude of the *politique* meant a policy of co-existence which was to be resolved by diplomacy. E. H. Harbison, however, has reminded us that Sir Francis Walsingham, a staunch Protestant, saw the problem, as some others do today, primarily as an ideological conflict—Catholics against Protestants, the slave world against the free (Comments at the British History Conference, American Historical Association Meetings, Washington, December, 1955).

Elizabeth was always the *politique* rather than the religious fanatic, and she reluctantly came to the decision in 1585 that intervention with "limited" objectives in behalf of the Dutch, who were fighting for independence from Spain, was necessary for English national survival. Said the Queen: "We did manifestly see in what danger ourselves, our countries and people might shortly be, if in convenient time we did not speedily otherwise regard to prevent or stay the same" (A. L. Rowse, *The Expansion of Elizabethan England*, p. 241). The unraveling of the Babington Plot against Elizabeth in 1586, in which Mary, Queen of Scots, was clearly implicated, revealed the prototypes of modern espionage and counter-espionage systems. The extension of the "law of treason" by Parliament against Roman Catholics was a kind of internal security program. And even the Court of High Commission was declared illegal, usually though by Puritans, because it employed the "oath *ex officio*," which compelled

the accused to give an account of his irregularities and thus often incriminate himself (David Harrison, *Tudor England*, II, 130).

Unlike Communism today, however, international Catholicism in the Elizabethan period, as Harbison pointed out, was a different kind of revolutionary force, if indeed a revolutionary force at all. It was seeking to return its revolted provinces in the Netherlands to the traditional Catholic forms. Furthermore, Philip II's famous "Enterprise of England" was attempting nothing new from a religious viewpoint. It sought only a return to the days of Queen Mary or perhaps to the pre-Reformation days of Henry VIII. In this sense it is almost reactionary. If direct analogies are to be sought with our own times, it is possible that revolutionary Calvinism, as exemplified by the return of the Marian exiles, comes about as close to meeting the qualifications of an international conspiracy. From Geneva came not only the infectious ideology but also the ineffectual power which made it at once alike and different from Moscow-directed Communism.

There is a danger from pushing such suggestive analogies as these too far. The moralist historian frequently concludes that history "proves" or "shows" or "teaches" a specific "lesson" for our own day. He seeks transferable moral judgments from one period to another. He is soon dated because his "lessons" are usually drawn on the basis of insufficient evidence and because changing conditions oftentimes quickly make the "lessons" inapplicable. Most of the people who seek transferable moral judgments in history are really seeking texts for their own sermons instead of for thoughtful analysis.

If, then, our primary task is to develop our understanding of man through a study of the past in its relation to the present, we must select material which has some continuity (amidst the change) in all periods of history. If not, we will become complete relativists, and each generation will write and study history in a completely different fashion. In pursuing the elements of continuity, the historian begins to apply one or more interpretations or what we have already defined as the artistic formulation of facts. The art of the historian certainly involves literary style, for historical writing, in the hands of its ablest practitioners,

is a branch of literature. But the art of the historian is more than this. It is also the imaginative capacity to select and arrange facts in a meaningful and significant pattern, for facts, as David Hume wrote long ago, do not speak for themselves.

In seeking a significant pattern the historian must determine what is important and what is not important in the "seamless web of history." He may feel that the problem of importance can be measured only if it is contrasted with the *ifs* — the what-might-have-beens. G. M. Trevelyan once wrote a fascinating essay on the subject "If Napoleon Had Won the Battle of Waterloo" (reprinted in *Clio, a Muse*). Although a consideration of the might-have-beens may give us a limited perspective and make us ever aware of the important role of contingency in history, nevertheless it cannot be carried very far before it must inevitably lead to a myriad of unknowable possibilities. A more valuable criterion is suggestive of Bentham's principle of utility. That is to say, one fact or a group of facts is more important than another if it affects more people for a longer time or in a particularly intensive fashion. Whatever the criteria of significance are, much that is selected as important will depend upon the point of view of the historian.

The number of interpretations that historians apply, when they seek to reduce the multiplicity of human experience to a significant and comprehensive pattern, is almost as large as the actual number of practicing historians. My particular approach is an attempt to delineate a broad problem which has relevance to all periods of English history including the present. Let me say at once that I regard it by no means as the "key" which will unlock all of the mysteries of English history. Indeed, I seriously doubt if such a "key" exists. It does, however, have the advantage of providing a principle of organization which shows the relationship of certain historical configurations drawn from different chronological periods.

The stuff of human history, and particularly of English history, may be thought of as oscillating between two extreme positions, either the ends of a straight line or the polar points of a sphere; at one extreme is liberty and freedom, at the other is discipline and order. Unrestrained freedom, if carried to excess,

leads to chaos and anarchy. This was, in general, the condition of England in the 1640's when the nation was torn by civil wars. Against this state of affairs Thomas Hobbes wrote his great political work, *Leviathan*, in 1651. Unrestrained order, if carried to excess leads to absolutism and tyranny. This was, in general the condition of England in the 1680's during the ascendancy of James II. Against this state of affairs John Locke wrote his great treatises on government.

It seems to me that English history is the successful reconciliation of the virtues and the weaknesses of these two extremes. Arthur Bryant has put it this way. "Loving public liberty, yet finding that it could not exist without public order, the English devoted themselves to making the two compatible. Freedom within a framework of discipline became their ideal" (*The Story of England*, I, 21). This successful reconciliation of extremes has been achieved through compromise, give-and-take, live-and-let-live, or what some people refer to as "muddling through." Whatever it is called, it seems to me that this element of compromise is the great achievement of English history. This is why it merits study. I want to suggest two examples of a successful compromise and one of an unsuccessful attempt.

I. From our vantage point in the twentieth century it appears at first glance that the serf or villein in English manorialism had a distinctly bad time of it in nearly any aspect of his life you might care to consider. I am not so sure the villein would always have agreed with us, especially during the Anglo-Saxon beginnings rather than the decline of English manorialism toward the end of the medieval period. The Danish raiders of the ninth century had rendered powerless the small farmer and his fellow villagers. Protection against these invaders, especially in Northumbria and Mercia, became imperative. Consequently, the help of some rich neighbor was sought in order to secure beasts, tools, and seed in return for which goods and services were given to the lord and his descendants by the small farmer and his heirs. The price of this newly-found security against the fear of external dangers was a loss of personal freedom.

The villein was forced to render the *heriot*, *merchet*, and love-boons to his lord; he was not

even allowed to leave the manor, and the church exacted mortuary fees from him and imposed marital restrictions. He had not, however, sunk into bondage; he could not be bought and sold at public auction. The obligations and duties of the villein came to be not only personal but communal as well. The "custom of the manor" not only bound the serf in the performance of his duties but also protected the serf, to some extent, from exploitation by his lord. The demands upon the serf oftentimes were not as onerous in practice as they appeared in theory, and the exactness with which services were defined protected the serf from further demands being made upon him. For example, the serf generally worked half days for his lord rather than full days as was customarily stated. Seldom did he work more than the designated number of full days. There is no doubt but what the system was abused, and the strong benefited at the expense of the personal liberty of the weak. Such was the manorial system in which the surplus wealth derived from the land came to be enjoyed by those who, especially in the beginning, had the means to protect the small farmer from lawless violence.

II. The basic engine of change in the nineteenth century, as J. Bartlett Brebner has noted, was the industrialization of Britain (*Journal of Economic History, Supplement*, VIII [1948], 59-73). Ever since the days of A. V. Dicey it has been customary to refer to the economic theory of this phenomenon, especially during the middle fifty years of the century, as *laissez-faire*. The great high priest of the *laissez-faire* point of view was Adam Smith, who believed in the *natural* identification of the interests of all men "led by an invisible hand." The end result would be the general good. In more recent years scholars have come to challenge this concept and have seriously questioned whether or not England ever was a *laissez-faire* state, especially since the first important factory act (1833) was on the statute books long before the corn laws were repealed (1846). It seems apparent that as the state took its hands off foreign commerce and removed its imperial regulations it was simultaneously putting its hands on the home industries.

The economic theory for the series of statutes of which the factory act was the prize specimen was called government intervention. The

great high priest of the policy of government intervention was Jeremy Bentham, who believed in the *artificial* identification of the interests of all men by means of the "felicific calculus." The end result would be the greatest good for the greatest number. Whereas Smith assumed that my desire to buy steak could be harmoniously gratified by the butcher's desire to sell his beef in a commercial society, Bentham assumed that my desire, as a factory worker, to reduce my hours of daily work, would be stoutly resisted by my factory employer, in an industrial society. This conflict of self-interests could not be resolved unless one party would suffer a loss of liberty. A victory for the factory worker would mean a loss of the freedom of contract. A victory for the factory owner would mean a loss of the freedom of leisure time. Bentham's solution in case of conflict was quantitative rather than qualitative—let the greater number decide; and it was dramatically implemented by the three reform bills of the nineteenth century, which ultimately brought manhood suffrage to Britain.

A man who had his reservations about the qualitative approach was John Stuart Mill. He believed that on questions of social morality, i.e. of duty to others, the opinion of an overruling majority, though often wrong, was likely to be still oftener right. But on questions of private conduct, where no harm was done to others, Mill believed that the opinion of an overruling majority was quite as likely to be wrong as right. In his famous essay, *On Liberty*, Mill summarized the problem as follows:

To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being; to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity—is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government (Chapter V).

III. The failure of Oliver Cromwell as a political leader is an example of the inability to reconcile the two extremes of religious liberty

and political order. Cromwell attempted to preserve the former by setting up a considerable degree of religious toleration. In spite of his exclusion of Roman Catholics and Anglicans, Cromwell never departed from the principle of liberty of conscience, narrow by modern standards, but which did include the Quakers and the Jews. With these exceptions Cromwell thought that all men have the right within limits to seek the truth in their own way. "By the bowels of Christ," he once said, "remember that you may be mistaken." Religious liberty he would allow but political liberty he feared.

Cromwell's tragedy lay, says Maurice Ashley, in his inability to find a constitutional government; and for five and a half years his is the story of how a military dictator sought respectability. He could neither get along with Parliament nor without it (*England in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 97-104). "I am as much for government by consent as any man," he once remarked, "but where will you find that consent?" In 1653 he tried to find that "consent" in the Parliament of Saints—the "Barebones" Parliament—but after a few months he became just as disillusioned with the bungling

reforms of "good men"—the Elect of God—as he had been previously disillusioned with the emphasis on "good laws" of the Levellers. Not "wedded" or "glued" to forms of government, Cromwell set up the rule of the Major-Generals, i.e. rule by the Army rather than by Parliament. It proved to be extremely unpopular and unsuccessful, and much of the English and American dislike of peacetime standing armies stems from this episode. Cromwell's political rule rested solely on the support of the Army, and the republican sentiment in that organization prevented him from accepting an offer of the throne of England itself.

One of Cromwell's Army chaplains correctly assessed the issue of the Puritan Revolution. "The government of Christ seemes to be framed," wrote John Saltmarsh, "as neither *Tyranny* should get in at any *consociation*, nor *Anarchy* or *libertinisme* get in at any *dissociation*, or particular gathering, and at this beam we may weigh our controversies of this age" (*Dawnings of Light* [1644], p. 36). Indeed, we may say this is true of any age in English history.

The Palestine Problem: A Brief Geographical, Historical, and Political Evaluation

PART II

CAPT. RAYMOND R. FLUGEL

United States Air Force

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS

With the termination of British authority on 15 May 1948, forces of the Arab League states attacked Israel, as they had steadily threatened to do from the time a Jewish state was proposed. However, the diminutive state repulsed the onslaught of five Arab armies and considerably augmented the extent of its territory.

Beginning in February 1949 a series of ar-

mistices sponsored by the United Nations was signed between Israel and various Arab states. It is significant that the first armistice was signed with Egypt and that soon thereafter Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria followed the Egyptian lead.

However, the Arab states signified no intention of accepting the new state of affairs. They refused to implement those terms of the armistice agreements calling for negotiations leading to permanent peace. Instead they boycotted

the new state both economically and diplomatically. Egypt kept the Suez Canal closed to Israeli shipping and exercised the rights of a belligerent to search for contraband cargoes destined to or from Israel in non-Israeli bottoms. Egypt subsequently extended the blockade to the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's only other outlet to the sea. Israel itself was thus prevented from using cheap sea transportation from one part of the country to the other, via the Suez Canal. Under the armistice agreement with Israel, Egypt was bound to abstain from any act of blockade or belligerency, as well as from the threat or use of force from its own side of the armistice line against Israel's side. Since 1949 border violence has been the rule rather than the exception.

In May 1950 the United States, Great Britain, and France issued the Tripartite Declaration, affirming that they would keep the military balance within the Middle East by controlling arms sales and shipments to both the Arab states and Israel. The Declaration also guaranteed the armistice lines of 1949, thus evidencing the intention of the Western Powers to maintain the peace in the Middle East.

In September 1951 the U.N. Security Council requested Egypt to lift its anti-Israeli blockade, noting with concern that this action was inconsistent with its armistice obligations. Arab circles became increasingly resentful of any evidences of Western sympathy or support for Israel.

In March 1953 President Eisenhower expressed his concern over the deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States and said he intended "to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations."

In October 1953 the Israelis in retaliation for a series of Jordanian border raids, launched an attack in force against Kibya; this was the beginning of Israel's "tough" policy of reprisals. The U.N. Security Council censured Israel for the action, and Washington did likewise.

However, in January 1954 the Security Council of the U.N. voted, over Syrian protests, to permit Israel to build a power project on the Jordan river. Russia vetoed the resolution. In March 1954 another Soviet veto quashed a draft resolution expressing concern over Egypt's continued failure to comply with the

1951 resolution requesting the lifting of the blockade. These were among the first of a series of Soviet vetoes on the Arabs' behalf; thus did Moscow open its bid for Arab friendship.

Meanwhile, in February, Colonel Nasser had become Premier of Egypt. By July 1954 Nasser's negotiations with Britain over the Sudan and Suez had achieved success, largely through U.S. pressure on London to accept the Egyptian demands. On 27 July Britain agreed to quit the Canal Zone within eighteen months of ratification; formal agreement was completed in October. Both London and Washington believed that this concession would induce Egypt to join the Middle Eastern defense system which they were then in process of building.

Instead the Egyptian leader in January 1955 convened a meeting of the Arab League to block the projected defense organization. The Nasser government insisted that all Arab states remain neutral in the cold war. Egypt's rival, Iraq, defied Cairo and signed a pact of mutual cooperation with Turkey in February 1955 at Baghdad. Britain adhered to the pact in April and simultaneously gave up its three military bases in Iraq,¹³ thus terminating the Anglo-Iraqi alliance of 1930. Iraq thus became a fully independent state, responsible for its own defense. Also in April the United States signed a Mutual Defense Agreement with Iraq. In May a similar arms agreement was signed with Pakistan. Thus were laid the foundations of the Baghdad Pact, of which Iraq was the only Arab state member.

In late August 1955 the Nasser government made the first reported use of a newly developed type of force in border warfare against Israel. Patterned after the commandos, these specially trained elite forces were called the fedayeen. Their employment was described in special communiques lauding their prowess in penetrating Israel and vowing a war to the death against their enemies.

Not only did the deployment of the fedayeen break a period of relative tranquillity on the Egypt-Israel border, but it seemed to be timed as a response to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' proposal for a compromise settlement earlier in the month. Praised by U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld, the U.S. proposal called for basic resolution of the problem of refugees

by means of partial or token repatriation to Israel and property compensation for the remainder, economic development of the Jordan valley for joint Arab-Israeli benefit, and definitive delineation of frontiers which would then be placed under international guarantees. It may be recalled that the armistice lines and frontiers were covered by international guarantee in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

In the following month Egypt made the first major move to carry out a bold and independent Arab policy. Disregarding the Tripartite Declaration, Premier Nasser on 27 September 1955 revealed that Egypt would obtain heavy arms from the communist bloc on a barter basis. Nasser's prestige skyrocketed among the Arab states. The Egyptian-communist alignment shocked the West and alarmed Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, immediately began a long series of efforts to induce the Western powers to sell her heavy armament to offset the communist shipments to Egypt. The West, failing to implement the Tripartite Declaration, remained unresponsive to Israeli requests. Fear was expressed of abetting an arms race.

In November the West sponsored the formal organization at Baghdad of a Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) comprising Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States, although its chief sponsor, now refused to join the Baghdad Pact of "northern tier" states because Nasser and the Cairo powers attacked it incessantly. METO was organized as a military deterrent to Soviet expansion into the Middle East, but Nasser charged that METO was merely a cloak designed to hide the return of British and Western imperialism.

To counterbalance METO, Premier Nasser organized an allegedly neutralist and anti-Israel bloc of "southern tier" states: Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, (and later Yemen). Between October and December defense pacts were signed and joint military commands established.¹⁴ When, on 19 December, British efforts to persuade normally pro-British Jordan to join METO resulted in bloody anti-Western rioting in the Jordanian capital, London charged Egypt and Saudi Arabia with instigating the riots. The seriousness of Arab anti-Western sentiment became unmistakably evi-

dent in March 1956 when Jordan's king unceremoniously ousted British General John Glubb (Pasha) not only from his old post as commander of Jordan's crack Arab Legion — organized, trained, and equipped by the British Government — but from the country itself.

At Cairo in March 1956 the top leaders of Syria, Saudi-Arabia, and Egypt gathered to coordinate over-all Arab military and political strategy against Israel, preliminary to the imminent exercise of military pressure. An aggressive military policy against Israeli outposts and border areas was initiated in April 1956.

London now began to re-evaluate its Middle Eastern policy which had hitherto been predicated upon the assumption that it was Israel which posed the major threat to the peace of the Middle East. Under severe attack even within the ranks of its own Conservative Party for its "Suez policy" of withdrawal and concessions to Arab nationalism, the Eden government quickly adopted a strong policy line in the Middle East. With its major base in process of evacuation, severe measures were taken to insure the security of the base in Cyprus. All Middle East states were warned against starting a war. The British government, apparently unable to persuade Washington to make a joint statement reaffirming the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, unilaterally notified the Arab and Israeli governments that Britain would attack any aggressor state or states within 24 hours of the initiation of war. In mid-April, as Arab-Israeli border clashes increased in number and intensity, President Eisenhower declared that the United States government would use all Constitutional means available to prevent or stop aggression in the Middle East.

On 17 April the peacemakers *par excellence* appeared on the scene — the Soviet government announced its willingness to participate with Britain and France (the United States was not mentioned) in the peaceful settlement of Middle Eastern problems (from which it had been excluded by the Western powers in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950). The Soviets expressed the hope that the *independent* states of Israel and Egypt would resolve their differences, thus significantly shifting from a completely pro-Arab policy. Having adroitly started the trouble with the huge arms deal which threatened to shift the balance of military

power from Israel to Egypt, the Soviets had been content to watch the pot boil merrily. That the crisis reached its peak on the eve of the visit of Krushchev and Bulganin to Britain — when the Soviet statement was issued — indicated either superb timing or exceptional luck. Apparently fearing that the outbreak of a Middle Eastern war would draw sizeable U.S.-British military forces back into the area abutting the USSR, the Soviets hastened to dampen the fire, forestall possible Western military action, and divide Britain and France from the United States. It is not inconceivable that in their London conversations the Soviets sought further to discredit the United States and play upon British-American differences in a major effort to split the Anglo-American alliance. (This alliance, the Soviets believe, is unnatural and bound to break up anyway because of the impossibility of resolving the conflicting interests and ambitions of the two greatest capitalist powers.)

Significantly, within a day or so of the Soviet announcement of policy, the United Nations was enabled to obtain the agreement of both Arabs and Israelis to a new cease-fire convention. Limited though this agreement was to the mechanics of preventing or detecting violations of the new armistice, it is extremely doubtful if even this could have been achieved without Soviet concurrence in the U.N. undertaking.

Unfortunately, the new cease-fire agreement, negotiated by the U.N. and made possible by the support of the Great Powers, did not lead to a permanent peace settlement because in the U.N. Security Council debate on Palestine in June 1956 the Arab delegates — once again supported by the Soviets — refused to authorize the U.N. Secretary General to continue his good offices by exploring the possibilities of negotiating the basic issues of the Palestine problem. The Israeli government expressed complete support for the original, British-sponsored resolution. It offered to "negotiate at the highest level of its responsibility with any or all of the (Arab) states for a settlement of any or all of the problems outstanding between us."¹⁵ The Arabs ignored the Israeli offer, and castigated as "poison" the proposed U.N. resolution for "a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis." The Arab position, expressed by Ahmed el-Shukairy of Syria, was that the

only acceptable basis for settlement was the U.N.'s 1947 partition resolution. Mr. el-Shukairy went further, saying that "Palestine is nothing but southern Syria. . . . The establishment of Israel, its membership in the United Nations and all other (U.N.) resolutions (since 1947) will have to be revoked. Then, and only then, the United Nations can look forward to a solution. . . ."¹⁶ Britain, unwilling to bow to the Arab-Soviet demands, was forced to give way because "Washington felt that there was nothing to be gained by antagonizing the Arabs."¹⁷ Thus the U.N. Secretary General's further activities were limited merely to "efforts" to obtain compliance with the armistice.

Arab intransigence and the continued refusal of the United States government to supply or sell arms to offset the progressive communist rearmament of Egypt undoubtedly contributed to the reportedly widespread feeling in Israel that a situation comparable to that of 1948 was building up. In any event, Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion responded in mid-June to the new Arab challenge by dropping from his cabinet his moderate foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, who had failed signally to convince the West of Israel's need for arms. Ben-Gurion also imparted a stiffer tone to the basic policies of his government. In a major speech he made the following points:¹⁸

1. Unless the Arabs comply with all the terms of the armistice agreements, Israel will assume that they have repudiated the pacts in their entirety.
2. Retaliatory raids across the border will be resumed if the Arab governments again send guerrilla bands into Israeli territory.
3. Absolutely no concessions will be made in matters of sovereignty or territorial integrity, and a lasting peace settlement with the Arabs will be pursued. Big-power pressure for concessions will be firmly resisted.
4. Diplomacy is to be subordinated to security considerations.

By July serious fighting flared anew along the Jordan-Israel border. In the ensuing months "the violence . . . followed a consistent pattern — a series of Arab forays into Israeli territory, followed by large-scale Israeli reprisal attacks."¹⁹ After a heavy reprisal raid at

Husan, in retaliation for the killing of four Israeli archaeologists, the Israeli representatives walked out of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission in October when it became apparent that the U.N. chairman would vote to censure Israel.

The prelude to renewed Arab aggression on land occurred at sea in the form of intensified Egyptian pressure on Suez and Gulf of Aqaba shipping bound for Israel. Though this began in June just after the cease-fire, Israel did not react strongly until September. On 6 September however the Israeli government charged Egypt with "brazen disregard" of her obligations under the 1888 Constantinople Convention, citing Egypt's refusal to permit the Greek freighter *Pannegia* to deliver a cargo of cement to Elath. This interference of course also violated the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.

Israel, which had not been invited to attend the London Conference on the Suez question in August, had been critical of the West's response to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July. However, British Prime Minister Eden's speech of 12 September announcing the Big Three's original plan for a "canal users' association" was welcomed by the Israeli government as "a significant contribution to the pacification of the area."²⁰ Speculation arose as to possible British military assistance or bases in Israel. "Even the extreme nationalist Herut party, which never ceases its cry for forceful action against Egypt, seemed pleased with the new move. Menachem Beigin, fiery leader of Herut, went so far as to call for alliances with Britain and France against Egypt."²¹ Subsequently the users' association plan was watered down by Washington, and it was not long before President Nasser was in apparently firm control of the canal.

By late September the Egypt-Israel border also began to crackle with gunfire. The Egyptian border, unlike the Jordanian, had remained relatively quiet while Nasser was preoccupied with the canal crisis. As the fedayeen or commando-type raids progressed, President Nasser himself boldly expressed Egypt's intentions toward Israel in the following statement on 14 October:²²

I am not solely fighting against Israel. My

task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.

The same tone was adopted by the press, which had for some time under Nasser been calling for the obliteration of Israel. An example cited as typical by the permanent Israeli representative to the United Nations was derived from a leading Egyptian newspaper: "Israel will not be saved from the Arabs. She will be destroyed under the feet of Arab fighters and the flag of freedom will be unfurled over Palestine."²³ *The New York Times* reported that Cairo radio proclaimed President Nasser's watchword to Israel to be: "Prepare yourselves O Israel . . . for the day of your destruction is near. . . . We want revenge, and our revenge is Israel's death."²⁴

Against this background of incessant propaganda and border fighting, the pro-Nasser, anti-Western forces in Jordan won an important parliamentary election on 21 October. As a consequence King Hussein was prodded into acceptance of a unified army command under Egyptian leadership in the event of war with Israel.²⁵

When Hashemite Iraq offered in mid-October to send troops into Jordan to bolster the wobbly government of its sister kingdom, Israel protested strenuously, as did Iraq's rival, Egypt. Nasser denounced the Iraqi offer as part of another British plot to undermine Egyptian influence in Jordan. Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion bluntly opposed the move and reserved "freedom of action" if the troops of a "hostile state" moved into neighboring Jordan.

Against this background, the sudden Israeli blow against Egypt on 29 October could hardly prove an occasion for surprise. President Nasser however asserted on 1 November that Egypt had "no aggressive aims. Our policy was clear and plain."²⁶ Again, "we appealed for peace and said: 'We work for the welfare of Egypt' but imperialism wanted us to work for its own ends, to work for the realization of its policy.'" This address to the Egyptian people was directed primarily at countering the Anglo-French ultimatum of 30 October for a cease-fire as well as explaining the Egyptian retreat on

the Israeli front. The Israeli government, for its part, asserted that its action had been taken in the exercise of Israel's inherent right of self-defense. It stated that the object of its Sinai operation was to eliminate the bases from which armed Egyptian forces had been persistently attacking Israel.²⁷

POLITICAL EVALUATION:
PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Despite the advantages accruing to Israel as a result of her recent Sinai campaign against Egypt, the permanence of the present political division of Palestine may well be questioned. The Arabs, who occupied the land of Palestine for 1300 years, refuse to recognize and accept the accomplished fact of a Jewish state in Palestine. This is evident in numerous statements and proclamations addressed by Arab leaders and their controlled communications media to Arab and Israeli listeners. Officially and primarily for Western consumption, President Nasser and other Arab leaders evince a willingness to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the U.N. partition line of 1947 — a boundary which they unanimously and totally rejected at that time. Arab intentions however are most clearly evident in their conduct and actions. The adamant refusal to seek a settlement of the basic issues — frontiers and refugees — either through direct negotiations with the Israeli government or even indirectly through the United Nations is evidence of a negative nature. Apparently the Arabs feel that any negotiations with the Israeli government might be construed as evidence of diplomatic recognition of the existence of Israel. The perennial conduct of border warfare and propaganda against Israel, together with the preparations for massive rearmament, provides positive evidence of hostile intentions.

On their part the Israelis refuse to give up the approximately 2500 square miles of additional territory conquered in 1948-49 which a return to the 1947 partition line would involve. Not only is much of this fringe territory strategically valuable but it has been assiduously exploited at great expense with an eye toward its military as well as economic value. Similarly, the Israeli government will undoubtedly make every effort to retain at least the critical Gaza Strip which the Israeli forces overran in

the course of the Sinai-Gaza operations of October-November 1956.

Israel is now in a relatively stronger position than before the Sinai campaign. She has shattered the myth of Nasser's invincibility in the Arab world, mauled the Egyptian army and damaged its esprit, captured large quantities of communist-supplied arms and munitions, destroyed virtually all Egyptian military installations and facilities in the Sinai Peninsula, and occupied the territory of Egypt almost to the Suez Canal. Her people's confidence and morale have been enormously heightened, and her association with Britain and France in a major military campaign has banished her former sense of complete isolation. The exposure of Arab disunity which the Anglo-French-Israeli campaign revealed may not be easily rectified by Nasser and Arab League leaders.

If the Palestine problem could be resolved locally, that is, without reference to Great Power rivalry in the Middle East, there is little doubt that Israel would be able to maintain its present territorial integrity over a period of years, and perhaps indefinitely. Continued friction among the relatively backward Arab states, jealousy of rival leaders, and the fear of social revolution in most Arab countries together would tend to insure Israel the opportunity to survive as a Jewish enclave in a hostile Arab world. Were the 46 million Arabs of the Middle East ever to be welded into an effective political entity, they could themselves in time develop the necessary technological and military proficiency to overcome the modern, highly organized Israeli state of two million people.

However, it is most unlikely that the Palestine problem will be resolved locally. The attitudes and actions of the Great Powers will probably be decisive in determining the basic outcome and resolution of the problem. Therefore Israel has every reason to lament the decline of the West in this vast and strategically vital crossroads region of the Arab world. By the same token, the Arabs — and the Soviets — can but rejoice at the steady — and now accelerated — retreat of the Western powers from the Middle East. In recent years the United States has evinced little disposition to move responsibly into the vacuum being created by the departing West European powers. Fail-

ure to implement the Tripartite Declaration is a case in point. Whether the United States can reverse this trend and perhaps play a successful lone hand in the Middle East remains to be seen. If this occurs, Israel's chances of survival will increase proportionately.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has in the last few years manifested an avidity for power and influence in the Middle East, and taken tremendous strides toward the realization of these objectives. It would appear to be to Russia's advantage to keep the Palestine problem unresolved. In this way Soviet support of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism would be needed and could more readily command an enthusiastic response. If the Great Powers continue to oppose each other in Palestine, a protracted period of tension seems likely.

If the Great Powers should agree to remove this source of tension, the chances for an effective U.N. settlement would vastly improve. In such an event it is almost inconceivable that Arab sentiment and interests could ever again be ignored as they were in the 1947 U.N. resolution of partition. Some reduction in Israeli territory would appear to be the price of survival and acceptance in the Arab world. However, the prospects of such a solution seem presently remote.

Of course the possibility cannot be ruled out that time may inure the Arabs to the existence of the tough little Jewish state. In the meantime, the best long-term safeguard of the Israeli state — aside from its own dynamism — appears to be the United Nations, despite the chronic inability — which it shares with the Great Powers — of the world organization to resolve basic issues in a serious dispute.

In any solution of the Palestine question, the Great Powers as well as the smaller Middle Eastern powers will be extremely cognizant of and most sensitive to the effects that any given local settlement might have on the distribution of power within the region and between the East-West power blocs. Here the greatest prize and therefore the greatest impediment to successful conclusion of negotiations appears to be the Arab and Moslem blocs which exercise substantial voting influence in the U.N. as well as less considerable power outside it, controlling as they do the greater part of the numerous states extending from the Atlantic in North Africa to Indonesia in the Southwest Pacific and enjoying support among neutralists and native nationalists in both Africa and Asia.

¹³ U. S. Department of State. *U. S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1955*. Washington, 1956, p. 31.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 3 June 1956, p. 2E.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Moshe Brilliant. "Ben-Gurion Prepares for Bolder Policies." *The New York Times*, 24 June 1956, p. 4E.

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, 21 October 1956, p. 2E.

²⁰ Don Peretz. "What Suez Means to Israel." *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, 15 October 1956, p. 18.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Ambassador Abba Eban. "The Israel-Egypt Conflict — The Inherent Right of Self-defense." Address, 1st Emergency Session on the Palestine Question, General Assembly of the U.N., 1 Nov. 1956. Reprinted in *Vital Speeches*, 15 Nov. 1956, p. 68.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *The New York Times*, 11 Nov. 1956, p. 1E.

²⁵ That he did not openly join the Nasser bloc was partly due to Britain's pre-election announcement that it was sending its newest jet fighters to Jordan and to British support of Jordanian charges against Israel in the U. N. during the preceding month.

²⁶ Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt. "The Israel-Egypt Conflict—'We Shall Fight and Not Surrender.'" Delivered over the radio, Cairo, 1 Nov. 1956. Reprinted in *Vital Speeches*, 15 Nov. 1956, p. 71.

²⁷ Eban, op. cit., p. 66.

Learning the Lessons of History

SYDNEY SPIEGEL

Senior High School, Cheyenne, Wyoming

"The history they are taught brings few or none of the lessons the past has to offer."

—James Harvey Robinson,
The New History

"The laws of history will most certainly eventually be established but in a different

manner than has been conceived by some who have pretended to formulate them, or by others who deny such a possibility."

—Henri Berre and Lucien Febvre,
article on "History" in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Each year history teachers must face anew the disturbing questions: "Why are we studying this? What good will it do us? What practical value does it have? This is all *past*. Dead and buried—why bother about it *now*?"

To answer these questions convincingly is to take a long step toward a highly motivated classroom. Too often, however, the answer is a repetition of a theory which is not carried out in practice in the course of the year: "The present cannot be understood without a study of the past," or "History is man's social memory." If, after paying lip service to some such philosophy on the first day of the term, we then plunge into the material of history, asking students to master terms of treaties and genealogies of ruling families, students may well continue to question the value of the subject.

Of course certain motivational devices can create *some* motivation even where the philosophy of history is shallow, or even completely lacking. Quiz programs like the \$64,000 Question can create interest even in exotic desserts if the reward is great enough. But the challenging student's questions about the *value* of the subject is still not answered, even if the teacher does use advanced methodology, puzzles, games, committees, and assorted "tricks of the trade." Back in 1934 a critique of social studies classrooms reported that there was an "obsession with formalistic methodology" and that "the more fundamental problems of purpose, thought, value and content" had been neglected.¹

This is not to disparage technique, or discussion and research technique; but only to say that technique in itself is only adequate, motivationally speaking, when it is subservient to a dynamic content, the value of which is universally accepted by the students.

It is the contention of the writer that much of the value of history lies in a scientific approach to historical data, with the aim of *using* conclusions, generalizations, the "lessons of history," to deal with present-day social problems; and that students can be highly motivated to pursue historical study if this utility of the subject can be demonstrated, rather than just talked about. This scientific approach should be buttressed by adequate definition and classification of terms—as all sciences are—but also an aesthetic approach and the use of value

judgments, due to the fact that history is different from other sciences and must be studied in some unique ways.

Problem solving approach.—Educators who must face the challenging questions of students requiring them to justify the value of their subject have emphasized a problem-solving approach, using history as past experience to provide a basis for understanding and solving current problems. Ernest Mahan writes that "the best thinking seems to favor the contemporary problems approach for a general education course in social science, history being drawn upon for what it may have to contribute to the understanding and solution of the problem."²

But the technique of using history in a problem-solving approach is not a self-evident technique. There is not automatic transfer of the lessons of the past to current problems; and a study of the past for the past's own sake will certainly not have any automatic, self-evident bearing on current affairs, since transfer of learning depends upon the relevance of the thing learned to the new situation.³

A scientific approach.—While educators and historians may often agree on a problem-solving emphasis, they do not always agree on just what method should be used in order for history to throw light on current problems.

Yet what other field of thought has been more successful in dealing with problems than the scientific approach?

Can it be that the social sciences are the weakest sciences in dealing with current problems because they have not sufficiently mastered scientific methods? Certainly in the field of history many historians have pointed out the weaknesses of the craft in inductive reasoning, definition, classification, and generalization.⁴

No doubt, also, there have been many historians who have gone overboard in their admiration for the techniques of other disciplines, and have tried to fit history into a chemical or biological framework.⁵

It is my belief that in problem-solving, history must develop its own unique methods of using its material, while at the same time accepting some very general scientific techniques that are applicable to historical and human material. For example, laboratory ex-

periment and mathematical equations would not be applicable; but inductive thinking arriving at useful generalizations would be.

History as a general guide, not an exact one.—Since history deals with matter that thinks, and chemistry and physics deal with matter that does not think, history cannot be as exact a science as some of the natural sciences. Since humans can think, they do not follow laws with the exactitude of inorganic matter, and therefore all historical generalizations are *tentative*.

The corollary to this conclusion is that all attempts to learn from history will probably be unsuccessful unless the attempts are accompanied by an intensive study of the *current situation*. The basis of historical generalization is a theory of how human societies act, or how individuals and groups within societies behave. But since humans change their habits in new and changing environments, these generalizations are tentative and must be checked against the *current* set of habits and attitudes as the results of the *latest developments* in environment.⁶

But does this tentativeness mean that historical generalizations are completely useless? A general guide is better than no guide at all. The present, while unique, is not *entirely* different from the past, and thus we can learn *something* from history. Toynbee notes that every fact can be classified (and that we can generalize about classes) even if the facts are unique. "No two living bodies, animal or vegetable, are exactly alike, but that does not invalidate the sciences of physiology, biology, botany, zoology, and ethnology."⁷

Furthermore, although most of the natural sciences derive much of their prestige from their power to predict, many of these sciences do not possess absolute predictive power; "... historical phenomena are scarcely more difficult to predict than the weather and certainly not more difficult than volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. What would scientists think of a geophysicist who gives up the search for geophysical laws because of their inexactness?"⁸ History need not possess absolute predictive power nor absolute problem-solving power to be *useful*; other sciences arrive at conclusions that are tentative, yet those sciences do perform service for humanity.

Those who believe that history cannot be

scientific because of the inexactness of its conclusions are sometimes answered by those who claim that at present even the nuclear physicists believe that exactitude is no longer possible in their discipline.⁹ But the nuclear physicists are building atomic energy plants to generate electricity. We should judge a science not by its methodology alone, but by its results — by its success in solving the problems and serving the needs of humanity.¹⁰

Forming inductive laws. — The predictive power of the inductive laws of the natural sciences has proven to be a great boon to mankind, to the betterment of life, and solving man's problems of controlling nature.

But due to mankind's ability to think and reason, due to free will, due to a certain element of unpredictability in human behavior, it is impossible for social science to form scientific laws with the same rigidity as those of natural science.

Yet, precisely because free will is not *entirely* free, and because human nature is not *entirely* unpredictable, we can form certain useful but tentative historical generalizations. Our free will is limited by circumstances. Herbert Butterfield says, "There may be no known limits to the potentialities of the human mind, but so long as no instrument exists except a tin whistle only a limited kind of music will be composed, only a limited kind of music will in fact be conceived."¹¹

Gottschalk points out the possibilities of historical generalizations of limited predictive validity. He notes how Patrick Henry tried to use historical experience and warn King George that tyrannical action on the part of Caesar (who had his Brutus) and Charles the First (who had his Cromwell) had resulted in their ruin, and that similar action might have similar results for George III. Gottschalk comments, "Henry would have been unable to tell whether George III would or would not profit by their examples. For that he needed skills other than those of the historian. History alone was not enough for prediction; but it was helpful. George III might have profited by example."¹²

Handicaps to historical generalization.—One of the objections often made to a scientific use of history is that one cannot experiment with

human societies. History is based solely on observation without experiment.

And the advocates of the scientific approach usually point to the example of astronomy as a useful science also largely based on observation, rather than experiment.

Mathematical equations cannot be used very often in dealing with human affairs, yet they are used constantly in some of the other sciences—notably physics. Yet this objection is not insuperable: Darwin's laws of natural selection and his theory of evolution were based on observation of the biological past of living creatures without the aid of exact mathematical formulae.¹³

Another handicap to generalization is the fact that man's actions are affected by so many causes, including his own past history and his own ideas—that there is multiple causation for historical events. If we cannot decide what caused the Civil War, for example, how can we generalize about the cause of war generally?

I believe that multiple causation should not mean that we must reject a search for causes of events. I believe that it implies that we should take all causes for events into account and attempt to emphasize the most important. The alternative view—that the causes of social problems like war are undiscoverable due to their complexity—implies that social problems such as war will plague mankind forever. But I believe that mankind has solved so many problems by a rational, scientific approach that there is no reason to doubt the efficacy of this approach in dealing with human problems as well.

Another handicap to objective, scientific generalization is that objectivity in reference to history is often hindered by the attempt of pressure groups to read into history the lessons they wish to see.¹⁴ Roy Nichols questions whether the historian is able to offer that social understanding to society "which he owes society, but which society may not want."¹⁵ Part of the answer to this question might be for social scientists themselves to become a pressure group. Certainly people who spend their lives studying social problems can speak just as wisely on current affairs as, let's say, veterans' groups?

Many of the attempts to generalize about human affairs have come to grief trying to

fit universal, timeless generalizations to all types of societies. But there are very few generalizations about human societies that can be made for all time. For example, Edward Cheyney tried to formulate a historical law which would express a growing tendency on the part of all peoples and nations to demand democracy.¹⁶ Something might be said for that. But if we were living in ancient Egypt, we would be experiencing a growing tendency toward autocracy from a previous neolithic democracy. Therefore, our generalizations must be *epochal* in nature—different sets of generalizations for different epochs and different levels of organization of society.

Finally, there is the problem of historical evidence: much is lacking, much is scanty, and perhaps unreliable; yet this problem is also not insuperable. We do not accept historical evidence blindly; and we do have enough historical evidence for us to know quite a bit of history. Marc Bloch notes that we know that towns of ancient Chaldea must have maintained trading relations with India, since tombs contain necklaces of amazonite; ". . . it is not true," he says, "that the historian can see what goes on in his laboratory only through the eyes of another person. To be sure, he never arrives until after the experiment has been concluded. But under favorable circumstances, the experiment leaves behind certain residues which he can see with his own eyes."¹⁷ Actually, the very fact that we can be sceptical of certain historical evidence is an example of the advances that textual criticism has made—it is an example of our ability to use historical evidence wisely and scientifically.

Descriptive generalizations vs. predictive.—Historians generalize in other ways besides predictively. The type of generalization that has been implied in this paper thus far is a predictive type: anytime A happens, B will follow. But historians also generalize *descriptively*, such as, "The feudal period was one of disunity," or "The workday in America is eight hours." This might be compared to the physicist's describing the properties of certain substances, such as, "Gold is heavy and yellow." But this type of conclusion cannot compare in usefulness to the predictive statements that water will freeze or boil at certain temperatures, or that the proper mixture of hydrogen

and oxygen will produce water. If historians could predictively generalize, for example, that technical advances such as the discovery of fire, domestication of animals, etc., cannot be kept secret in the long run; and though some societies can forge ahead of others through the use of these technical advances, history shows that the rest of the race eventually catches up, then one may predict that the advances of industrialism, too, will spread over the globe, that the future will see automobile factories in the Belgian Congo, and steel mills in Tibet. It is this type of predictive generalization formulated inductively from the experience of history that is the most useful, and therefore the best method of generalizing from experience—as well as of providing one of the most important bases for classroom motivation.

It is true that such conclusions are tentative. Human beings are not irrevocably bound to obey historical laws, nor are they chained to a particular destiny. The very formulation of historical laws can lead people to modify their behavior and thus render the law invalid. It may well be that the Tibetans may refuse to industrialize. But the value of formation of historical laws lies in exposure of powerful trends, despite the exceptions; the value lies in the attempt to think about history and not just parrot it.

A sketchy study of history will not enable a student to form valid generalizations. On the contrary, the ability to make valid, predictive generalizations implies not only *extensive* knowledge of history, so that the student has scores, even hundreds of examples from which to generalize, but it also implies an *intensive* study of history so that the examples he compares are truly comparable and similar—and not just similar on the surface.

The aesthetic approach.—The approach to history through literature, good stories, drama, biography, patriotic recording of heroic achievements—in short, history as art rather than as science—can be a catalytic aid to intensive knowledge of history. The social scientists who wrote the *Social Science Research Bulletin* 64 on problems of historiography dealt with the problem of art vs. science in history by saying that there were two different kinds of minds: artistically minded historians, and scientifically minded historians.¹⁸

But philosophers of history such as Butterfield, Collingwood, Croce, and Dilthey have refused to make such a dichotomy, and have insisted that the field of history requires both art and science, imagination and investigation. Butterfield says, “. . . the facts must be delineated first with the cleanness and fullness which we demand in an epic poem or tragedy. We must have the real thing before we can have a science of a thing.”¹⁹ And Croce said that if you wanted to understand neolithic history you must try to imagine that you are a neolithic person—and even this: “Do you wish to understand the true history of a blade of grass? Try to become a blade of grass.”²⁰

According to this latter view, stories, poems, anecdotes, epics, novels, and motion pictures are not extra frills, “sidelights,” but are necessary adjuncts to the understanding of history and thus to the utility of it.

Value-judgments and use of history.—I believe that value-judgments are necessary to a scientific approach to history from two points of view: that of criticism and analysis of current human behavior, and as an aid to investigation of the past.

All scientists make value-judgments about the application of scientific knowledge. The agronomist criticizes current farming methods, and the physicians offer criticism of current medical practices.

Use of history therefore implies a similar analysis of current methods of social and political institutions, and a criticism of those methods based on historical experience. This in turn implies prescriptions of how things *should* be done in the future.

Robert S. Lynd offered just such value-judgments and prescriptions in *Knowledge for What?* For example, he criticizes American life for having no common goals, purposes, and ideals to inspire us as a nation. The prescription: “American culture, if it is to be creative in the personalities of those who live it, needs to discover and to build prominently into its structure a core of richly evocative common purposes which have meaning in terms of the great mass of the people.”²¹

Toynbee, similarly, makes value-judgments and prescriptions: the Roman civilization was destroyed, and this destruction was deplorable. Modern western civilization is in a Romanistic

decline and certain measures must be undertaken to prevent its fall.

Thus this technique calls for the formation of opinions concerning past civilizations, past characters, past events, as to whether they were beneficial or detrimental, in order that there may be analysis and criticism of the present. Marc Bloch scolds, "Robespierrists! Anti-Robespierrists! For pity's sake, simply tell us what Robespierre was."²² But if we cannot determine what our opinion is about the Robespierres of the past, we cannot determine what our opinion is about the Robespierres of the present. Social science students should be able to offer opinions and advice about Robespierres, monarchy, labor unions, price supports for farmers, socialized medicine, foreign policies, loyalty programs—and forming opinions about the past helps us form opinions in the present, since so much of what we find in the present often has had a close cousin in the past.

Value-judgments about both the past and the present can be an aid to further investigation of history, and history's utility. The value-judgment can be both a spur to investigation and a deductive basis for forming conclusions based on investigation. "The scientist . . . may be quite objective and as impassioned as he pleases in hoping to find evidences to prove or disprove some particular theory. . . . Distortion does not necessarily follow even though values influence the choice of hypotheses and the selection of data."²³ Charles A. Beard wrote, "Nearly all the influential writings in political philosophy or political theory, so called, are polemics directed to ends."²⁴

Morris Cohen pointed out that it was an error to suppose that scientific investigation proceeded purely by a Baconian inductive method. The facts alone cannot suggest an explanation of the facts. Pure induction, he said, "would reduce [the historian] to the passive role of a dictaphone."²⁵ Bert James Loewenberg writes, "It is only when we have a hypothesis that we have something to look for. Without ideas, nature is one big blooming confusion."²⁶

The necessity for improved classification of terms.—Science has often begun to make sense out of nature with proper classification and definition of phenomena. But many of the terms we use in social science are ill-defined, and

thus it is often difficult to classify or categorize a mode of conduct, a type of economy, or a form of government. What is a fascist? a communist? Cohen said, "Even the terms of invasion, rebellion and war denote things so heterogeneous that discrimination leading to the recognition of different kinds of sub-classes is necessary before we can expect to find a common cause. Villa's invasion of the United States was quite a different affair from Burgoyne's, and an American Indian rebellion or war a quite different sort of event from the World War of 1914-18."²⁷

Drawing historical parallels, classifying similar things together, provides a basis for discussion of causation, and thus generalization—similar events having similar causes—and thus an application of historical experience to present-day problems.

"For a sample list of generalizations, see 'Examples of Inductive Generalization from History,' *The Social Studies*, January 1957."

¹ American Historical Association, *Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission*, A report prepared by the Commission on Social Studies (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 70.

² Ernest Mahan, "Social Science in General Education," *Current Trends in Higher Education*, Ed. Ralph W. McDonald (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1949), p. 64.

Similar opinions are expressed by professional historians and philosophers: ". . . today we are interested in economic and social problems, and write economic and social histories. In the nature of things, it could not be otherwise."—J. W. Swain, "What is History?" *Journal of Philosophy*, XX (1923), 289.

"The object of the historical quest is no longer a past, for insights into social life and human behavior are sought for something; the resolution of a contemporary dilemma, the validation of a contemporary judgment. What is compelling in the past is determined by what is compelling in the present."—Bert James Loewenberg, "Some problems raised by Historical Relativism," *The Journal of Modern History*, XXI (1949), 18.

"... no matter how regrettable it may seem, society is also bound to ask of the historian (especially if he is also a teacher in our schools and colleges) how he otherwise can socially justify his expenditure of time and money; and the answer ought to have some relation to the understanding of contemporary man and his problems."—Louis Gottschalk, *Understanding History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 269.

³ Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton: University Press, 1939), p. 133.

⁴ David M. Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. xv.

Potter comments further (p. xviii), "In recent decades, as history has turned increasingly to the treatment of social and economic themes, such as changes in ideas or morals, the relations between diverse social classes, or the operation of economic forces upon society,

the historian's lack of systematic procedure in the practice of generalization has become a serious liability."

Other similar comments: "... having grown old in embryo as mere narrative, for long encumbered with legend, and for still longer preoccupied with only the most obvious events, it [history] is still very young as a rational attempt at analysis."—Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 13.

"That history can be regarded as a social science needs little argument. . . . The problem that remains is one of making more explicit as a matter of practice the status already recognized in principle—of making investigations more penetrating, analysis more precise, and demonstration more rigorous."—Social Science Research Council Bulletin 64, *Report of the Committee on Historiography* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954), p. 21.

And Arnold Toynbee: "This job of making sense of history is one of the crying needs of our day."—quoted in J. G. De Beus, *The Future of the West* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 58.

⁵ See Henry Adams, *The Tendency of History* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919). He tried to apply a law of thermodynamics concerning the dissipation of the world's energy to human society.

⁶ H. A. Hodges explains Dilthey's philosophy on this point as follows: "Dilthey replies that nothing is permanent in human nature except the physical and mental structure of man and his basic instincts. All ideas and beliefs, tastes, habits, institutions are historically conditioned."—H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey; An Introduction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), p. 97.

⁷ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged by D. C. Somervell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 43. The social scientists who authored the SSRC Bulletin 64 comment, "History is not exclusively chaos or chance: a degree of observable order and pattern, of partially predictable regularity exists in human behavior." Bulletin 64, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁸ Edgar Zilsel, "Physics and the Problem of Historico-Sociological Laws," *Philosophy of Science*, VIII (1941), 570. And Bulletin 64 (*op. cit.*, p. 137): "Most scientific hypotheses and theories are 'working hypotheses' or estimates of probabilities, not definitive statements of certainties. That a working hypothesis is provisional does not indicate that it is unscientific. On the contrary, science could not proceed at all without theoretical propositions of this tentative character."

⁹ See Rene Albrecht-Carrie, "Social Sciences and History," *Social Education*, November, 1952, and the answer to that article in the same magazine by Albert Alexander, January, 1953.

¹⁰ Guido de Ruggiero wrote, "... to know in order to have a useful guide for conduct and to be in a position to control the forces of nature for the sake of the commonweal, is the motto of science, and of that philosophy which would ally itself to science." ("Positivism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XII).

John W. Kidd in his article, "Social Science or Social Studies," *Social Education*, May, 1953, argued that history is a science to the extent that its methods are scientific; my argument is that it is a science to the extent that it can solve problems and serve the needs of humanity. One should judge by results, not methods. He writes, "To the extent that history is a scientific study, that is, it approaches the human record without bias, with patience, with a determination to reveal equally all discovered fact, and that without coloring,

then history is a social science." This is the "scientific" view that has given us so many antiquarian-minded masters' theses on obscure and useless subjects. History has to approach the human record not only without bias, but with a concern for humanity and a sensitivity to current problems.

¹¹ Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 84.

¹² Gottschalk, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹³ From a presidential address to the American Historical Association by William Sloane in 1911, quoted in Herman Ausubel, *Historians and Their Craft: A Study of the Presidential Addresses of the American Historical Association 1884-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 217.

¹⁴ "Perry Miller has wisely remarked of the Puritans that they not so much founded their society on the Scriptures as searched the Scriptures for corroboration of the society they had founded." Wilson O. Clough, *Our Long Heritage* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 15.

¹⁵ Roy F. Nichols, "The Historian's Dilemma," *Proceedings of the Middle States Association of History and Social Science Teachers*, 1940-41, p. 8.

¹⁶ Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," *American Historical Review*, XXIX (1924), 242.

¹⁷ Bloch, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁸ SSRC Bulletin 64, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

An argument against the scientific use of history appeared in *Social Studies*, January, 1955: "History is like no other course in high school. It cannot be reduced to a scheme of theorems. Nor yet can it be a survey or an anthology. Nor is it a collection of facts from which scientific generalizations can be made. It is a story of people, unscientific, impassioned, illogical, reflecting prejudice and heroism, stupidity and charity. It is a chronicle of social questions and the answers given by force, by reason, and by sentiment, at various times in the past."—Howard C. Westwood, "A Layman's View of High School American History," *Social Studies*, January, 1955.

One is tempted to repeat the waggish statement, "history is just one damn thing after another." But we do learn from the past and modify our behavior accordingly; people who warn against "Washington Witch Hunts" are basing their warnings on actual witch hunts of the past; people who urge soldiers to act heroically in warfare have taken ideas of heroism from heroic actions in history. Because people act in an "unscientific, impassioned, illogical" manner does not mean that dispassionate, logical scientists cannot generalize about their behavior; the characterization of man's behavior as unscientific and impassioned is itself a generalization.

¹⁹ Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²⁰ Quoted in R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 199.

²¹ Lynd, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

²² Bloch, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²³ SSRC Bulletin 64, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

²⁴ Charles A. Beard, "Grounds for a Reconsideration of Historiography," *Social Science Research Council Bulletin* 54 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1946), p. 9.

²⁵ Morris R. Cohen, *The Meaning of Human History* (Lasalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1947), p. 68.

²⁶ Loewenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²⁷ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

The Fusion of Social Studies in the Elementary School

IRENE A. HUBIN

Saddle River, New Jersey

Analysis of a current elementary school program is very likely to uncover the term "social studies." By strict definition this term has come to mean, "those portions of history, geography, civics, and other social sciences that are selected for use in teaching."¹ In addition the term in many areas also includes, ". . . the social sciences, art, literature, music, and even some phases of science."²

The current controversy as to the practicability of combining several subjects into one course of study or of teaching these subjects separately under their individual titles has been argued from diametrically opposed positions. Some individuals advocate the complete elimination of the teaching of the separate subjects and subsume the social studies. Others staunchly defend the teaching of individual subjects and ridicule the social studies. This latter feeling is based on the belief that certain subjects are neglected or, at best, inadequately presented in the curriculum.

For the purposes of this paper the former group are referred to as the fusionists and the latter group as the separatists. It must be appreciated that there are numerous gradations ranging between these two puristic extremes. However, space and time limitations do not permit a comprehensive investigation of these intermediate categories.

It is the opinion of the writer that on the elementary school level the social studies should be given a fusionistic or merged treatment only if a proper balancing of all the constituent subjects is maintained. This stand helps to defeat the main objection advanced by the separatists, namely, inadequate coverage and neglect.

In order to justify the position taken in this paper, a short historical treatment of the social studies in the American school system is introduced for orientation and background purposes.

"The social studies were practically nonexistent in the Latin grammar school."³ "Ancient history was required in the study of the classics in the Colonial Latin schools, but it was not until the second half of the eighteenth century that history was treated as a separate subject."⁴

From these quotes it can be appreciated that there has been a tardy development of social studies in the American educational system.

"With the rise of the academy about 1750, history began to appear in the list of subjects offered."⁵ One of the academies founded in 1751 included both ancient and modern history as part of its curriculum.⁶

The textbooks used at this time were imported from Europe and a few pages of history were included in the readers and geographies. Morse's *Geography* in 1788 devoted twenty pages to the events in United States history after the Revolution.⁷

It should be noted, however, that, "History was not recognized in many curricula during the period from 1750 to 1815."⁸

The History of America written by Benjamin Franklin in 1795 was the first American history written especially for children.

These early books, usually in the form of questions and answers (catechetical form), were encyclopedic and meant to be memorized.⁹

After the War of 1812, twenty academies in New York and New England offered history as a part of their curriculum.¹⁰ It was believed at this time that, "Spelling, geography, history, government, constitutional law, and any number of other subjects were demanded as 'preparation for citizenship.'"¹¹

In 1826 geography was required by law in Massachusetts and United States History was required by all high schools in Massachusetts by 1827. Other public and private schools also

included history and geography between 1820 and 1860 as regular subjects.¹²

History and geography were recognized courses in our schools before the 1860's. "The history that was taught was American history in the upper elementary grades and in the academies. Geography during this period was taught as an elementary school subject."¹³

Further evidence of the establishment of history as a separate subject is indicated in a report by the New York Superintendent of Schools in 1844, wherein it was revealed that history was taught in most of the elementary schools in the state.¹⁴

Between 1860 and 1892 United States history was mostly an elementary school subject and general history was a secondary school subject.¹⁵ Geography still remained an elementary school subject.

Many history and geography books were no longer written in the catechetical style during this period. A sample of the new style textbook may be seen in Guyot's geography book in 1866 which emphasized the social side of geography. Guyot's book demonstrated how man was influenced by his environment.

History also became an important subject in the colleges during this period.

From 1892 to 1922 as the result of many committees appointed to recommend the program of study to be followed by the schools, social studies was, "... subjected to a major upheaval as a part of the general reorganization of secondary education, with the result that greater emphasis was given to the other social studies, economics, sociology, and citizenship. More stress was placed on modern history, and more effort was made to relate the work to actual social problems."¹⁶

Earle Rugg states in the 23rd Yearbook (p. 61) that, "It does not appear that committee procedure was influential in the development of geography teaching since 1890; probably because geography was principally an elementary subject."

The social studies emerged as a field after 1916 as a result of the publication *The Social Studies in Secondary Education* issued by the Committee on the Social Studies of the National Education Association. (U.S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 28, 1916).¹⁷

This Committee defined social studies as,

"those whose subject matter relates directly to the organization and development of human society and to man as a member of social groups."¹⁸

Following the publication of this bulletin and throughout the 1920's, very little material dealing with the teaching of the social studies was generated. It should be noted that during this rather barren period, there was a review of the social studies program in the late 1920's by the Commission on the Social Studies created by the American Historical Association. This group made an extensive analysis of the many phases of social studies in the public schools.

In this Commission's own words, "The program of social science instruction should not be organized as a separate and isolated division of the curriculum but rather should be closely integrated with other activities and subjects so that the entire curriculum of the school may constitute a unified attack upon the complicated problem of life in contemporary society."¹⁹

The Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association stated in its yearbook in 1936 that, "The teaching of facts in isolation and remote from their setting may lead to hazy ideas and confusion instead of vivid impressions and fundamental understandings. . . . The place of organization should permit maximum interplay between the various aspects of the social studies."²⁰

A year later Tiegs stated in his book, *The Management of Learning in the Elementary Schools*, "With the exception of a small minority who would return to a completely departmentalized plan of study most educators consider this fusion of courses not only useful but essential. It is the 'heart' or the 'core' of the curriculum."²¹

Here we can observe the germination of thought which developed fusionistic ideas. An erosion of older philosophical concepts which had started to permeate with Guyot's *Geography* in the post Civil War era was beginning to take on significant form and substance by the 1930's. It can be appreciated that such relatively recent concepts must have met with strenuous and militant opposition at that time.

In 1948, the Department of Education in the State of New Jersey stated in its bulletin, "A Guide for the Teaching of the History of the U.S." (p. 9), "Give history a place to live

by teaching it in its rightful geographic setting. History has happened somewhere."

At present, opinions and feelings of many educators in the matter of fusion or separation of the social studies appear to be in favor of the fusion treatment.

Cartwright in his article, *What Is Happening in the Social Studies*, mentions that one of the changes to be noted in the elementary school curriculum is that there is "... less emphasis on geography as a separate subject..."²²

Seeger points out that, "The purpose of combining several subjects into one course of study fundamentally is to make for more effective teaching, and the long-range goals are to contribute to the development of the child, to his socialization, to his understanding of and adjustment to his own culture."²³

The separatists argue that significant disadvantages of fusionistic treatment of the social studies in the elementary school are developed. A brief summation of the major points developed by the separatists is presented below.

1. The fused organization does not adequately cover as much material as the separate subject organization. (The social-studies curriculums and teaching have been held responsible for poor scores made by college freshmen on a history test.²⁴)
2. The children are not mature enough to engage in so-called "adult" modes of reasoning.
3. The fusion system demands more intensive preparation, time consumption, and broader background than are available to the average teacher.
4. Fusionism develops distinct possibilities for serious omissions and critical gaps in individual subject material.
5. Generalizations develop under fusion treatment which are less likely to occur under separatism.
6. Fusion oftentimes is characterized by strained attempts to "bring together that which belongs together."²⁵
7. Fusionism is less likely to be organized in logical and developmental sequence.
8. Improper application of fusionism can result in confusion and frustrations in the child.
9. There is an inadequacy and in some cases a

complete lack of adequate text material oriented along true fusionistic principles.

10. Opposition to fusionistic principles can be generated by various groups because of their lack of understanding and familiarity with such relatively recent concepts. Overcoming inertia, custom, and traditional practices presents serious obstacles toward the innovation of fusionism.

It can be seen that there are significant elements of truth in these objections of the separatists. Analysis of the objections indicates that overall there is evidenced the basic and common human trait of objection to change. Teachers accustomed through long exposure to traditional disciplines would naturally present vigorous protest toward the disruptive program concepts incorporated in fusionism.

Primarily, the basis of the objections is emotional. Other bases can be identified as having their roots in cultural soils.

In overcoming these objections the fusionists present their side of the picture as outlined below:

1. Fusionism makes education realistic, representative, and interesting to the student.
2. The child obtains a more comprehensive appreciation of society, social problems, and current situations.
3. Fusionism develops intellectual curiosity and stimulates investigation on the part of the student.
4. Research indicates that fusionism develops superior student groups and a better retention of the significant facts.²⁶
5. A fusionistic program can yield itself more readily to the maturation levels of the various children.
6. Fusionism enables the selection of experiences which will result in socialized human beings.
7. The fusionistic approach develops a greater sense of personal worth and self-confidence in the child.
8. Individual differences in children are more easily uncovered and handled.
9. A fusionistic program can yield itself more readily to the handling of social concepts by the child, which research indicates the child handles quite successfully during this period of development.²⁷
10. Specialization under separatism may well

result in lack of interest on the part of the student because of an inaptitude in particular areas.

11. Narrowness involved in specialization develops limited and restricted views.
12. Fusionism eliminates needless rote learning and stimulates constructive and original thinking in the maturing child.

The major positions just outlined by the debating groups seem to indicate that the separatists are primarily characterized by inactive and lithologic attitudes. Evidence of this is seen in their claim that the fusion system demands intensive preparation and is exceedingly time-consuming. They further assert that the broad background needed by a fusionist is unavailable. The grounds advanced here definitely point toward an attitude which might be characterized as "leave well enough alone." Such a philosophy is restrictive, blocks betterment, and inhibits progress.

The obvious need in overcoming these objections lies in the area of better teacher training and a reorientation of traditional and constricted thinking.

Their general claims as to omissions, gaps in subject material, generalizations, omission of logic, and development of frustration all focus on preconceived notions and lack of familiarity with the basic concepts of fusionism.

Their statement that fusionism lacks logical and developmental sequence is utterly unfounded. What could be more logical than the coordinated interrelations demonstrable in history and geography? For instance, fusion takes place in a study of ancient Egypt when the study entails knowing the way the people lived, the influence of geographical factors, and the limitations of their economy. The logical treatment would seem to be to handle these subjects concurrently. Innumerable other illustrations of similar relations can be brought to mind. The underlying realism of such a presentation forgoes any discussion.

About the only realistic and defensible objection advanced by the separatists is the one concerning the potential threat posed by various groups to the innovation of fusionism. The attitudes which could be developed by antagonistically oriented groups, such as parents, might be analogous in some degree to the con-

troversy now centering around progressive versus traditional philosophies.

An inadvertent introduction of a fusionistic program in our educational structure might well develop works similar to *Why Johnny Can't Read*. Careful, meticulous, detailed analysis of the social studies curricula has to be undertaken by competent personnel before fusionism can be introduced. If these criteria are neglected or overlooked, we might very well find a future best seller entitled, *Why Johnny Doesn't Know His American History*.

This paper has attempted to show that fusionism, a relatively recent philosophy in education, has certain advantages over traditional teaching treatments. Fusionism when compared to separatism is in essence a new-born babe. An over enthusiastic introduction, a mishandling of the philosophy, and an application of its principles by the unskilled can result in a heterogeneous growth.

Underlying the thesis of fusionism must be the appreciation that we are dealing with new and somewhat untried doctrines. However, it does hold forth promise for the betterment of our educational techniques. Wise application, informed leadership, and controlled experimentation can develop better and more interested student bodies and more thoroughly prepared candidates for the assumption of positions in society.

¹ Ralph C. Preston, *Teaching Social Studies in the Elementary School*, (Rinehart & Co., N. Y., 1956) p. 3.

² W. B. Brown, "A New Approach to the Social Studies," *The Social Studies*, 27:12-17, 1936, p. 12.

³ Della Goode Fancier and Claude C. Crawford, *Teaching the Social Studies* (C. Crawford, Los Angeles, 1932) p. 35.

⁴ Monica Kiefer, *American Children Through Their Books 1700-1835* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948) p. 125.

⁵ E. P. Cubberley, *The History of Education* (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1920) pp. 696-697.

⁶ See H. J. Johnson, *Teaching of History in Elementary and Secondary Schools* (Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1916) p. 128.

⁷ See W. F. Russell, "The Entrance of History into the Curriculum of the Secondary School," *History Teachers' Magazine*, 5: pp. 312-315.

⁸ Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁹ See Albert Perry Brigham and Richard E. Dodge, *Nineteenth Century Textbooks of Geography*, 32 Year-book, National Society for the Study of Education, "The Teaching of Geography," Chapter 1, p. 3.

¹⁰ See Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹¹ R. Freeman Butts, and Lawrence A. Cremin, *A History of Education in American Culture* (Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1953) p. 213.

¹² Earle Rugg, *How the Current Courses in History, Geography and Civics Came to Be What They Are*, 22 Yearbook, Part II, National Society for the Study of Education, "Social Studies in the Elementary & Secondary School," 1923, Chapter 4, p. 55.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁴ See Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁵ See *Report of the United States Bureau of Education*, 1888, p. 404.

¹⁶ Fancier & Crawford, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

¹⁷ See Edwin R. Carr, *Guide to Reading for Social Studies Teachers*, The National Council for the Social Studies, Bulletin No. 26, 1951, p. 90.

¹⁸ Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, in the volume *Conclusions and Recommendations* (Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1934) p. 9.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁰ 14th Yearbook, 1936, *The Social Studies Curriculum*, (The Dept. of Superintendence, Washington, 1936) pp. 231-232.

²¹ E. W. Tiegs, *The Management of Learning in the Elementary Schools* (Longmans, Green & Co., N. Y., 1937) p. 72.

²² William H. Cartwright, *What is Happening in the Social Studies: II, Social Education*, Vol. 18, No. 3, National Council for the Social Studies, March, 1954, p. 115.

²³ Martin L. Seeger, III, "Historical Values in A Sixth Grade Social Studies Unit," *The Social Studies*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, Jan. 1956.

²⁴ See H. R. Fraser, "The Inside Story of the 'New York Times' Test," *School and Society*, 58:82-84 (Aug. 7), 1943.

²⁵ Preston, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

²⁶ See D. K. Farthing, *Techniques for the Appraisal of Elementary School Instructional Programs* (State Superintendent of Public Schools, Jefferson, Mo., 1940)

²⁷ See Arnold Gesell and Frances L. Ilg, *Infant and Child in the Culture of Today* (Harper, N. Y., 1943).

World War I, Japan's Road to Pearl Harbor

WILLIAM H. SHANNON

Arundel H. S., Gambrills, Maryland

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on Germany. This seemed strange to some military observers who recalled the high regard Japan held for mighty Germany's war machine. Not only had Japan respected such strength but many of her army and naval officers had been sent to Germany for special training in the imperial army and navy. Despite these close ties Japan preferred to join the Allies.

The decision for war was not made from a spirit of friendliness or sympathy toward the Allies. Japan, cautious and opportunistic, arrived at the solution purely on the basis of the benefits that would accrue to her. Such benefits would make her imperial government the dominant power in the Far East.

It was significant that the great naval hero of the Russo-Japanese War, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, helped to shape Japan's war plans. He, more than any other member of the government, realized that Japan's destiny in the Pacific lay in the establishment of a powerful navy. By entering World War I on the side of the Allies, Japan could gain such a fleet.

Togo, a shrewd diplomatist with considerable forethought, outlined Japan's program to the newly established government of Count Okuma thus:

- a) By entering the war against Germany Japan would comply with a treaty made with Britain in 1902. Such compliance would make it seem as if Japan, a faithful ally, intended to carry out the terms of the treaty in detail. Actually it would enable her to carry out her designs with little interference from the Allies.
- b) Because of Japan's fulfillment of the treaty, she could justifiably ask as a reward the insular possessions of Germany in the Pacific as well as Tsingtao, the German possession on the Shantung peninsula. Such a prize as the latter would give Japan a foothold on the continent of Asia.
- c) The acquisition of all the German possessions would enable Japan to build future naval bases from which she could more effectively control the Pacific.

Togo, of course, was merely adding a finesse to the imperialistic pattern which Japan had been following since the 1890's. The Chinese war of 1894-95 had enabled Japan to get control of the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores. That war also placed her in a strong position to wield a free hand in the internal affairs of Korea.

The treaty with Great Britain in 1902 not

only gave her the recognition and backing of the world's greatest naval power but it also sanctioned the political and economic rights of both countries in China and Korea. Both nations were mutually pledged to come to each other's aid in case either was attacked by a third power. This treaty in particular made Japan feel secure from the threat of a possible naval war with the United States.

In the years 1904-1905 Japan, through her defeat of Czarist Russia, entered the ranks of the nations of the world as a formidable and contending naval power. In addition to such a gain in prestige, Japan was compensated with strategic territorial possessions. The little island acquired Russia's lease from China of the Liaotung peninsula as well as the southern section of the Manchurian railway from Port Arthur to Kwanshengtze, including all the mining and mineral rights. The southern half of the island of Sakhalin was also ceded to Japan.

With the outbreak of World War I, Japan, unchallenged by any other power, was paving her way to a position of dominance in the Far East without any likelihood of actually becoming involved with the Central Powers. The time had come to assert herself and Japan with little resistance before her was in a position to expel Germany from the Far East. The movement was of a diplomatic nature rather than one of armed aggression.

The Japanese government was well aware that elements of the German fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Count Maximilian Von Spee were lying off the shores of Liaotung. The German Admiral had no particular fight with Japan. Least of all did he intend to allow himself to be led into a possible trap. Before Japan's declaration of war was announced, Von Spee had gone to great lengths to assure the ambassador in Tokyo that he would not attack in British-China waters and that he would personally protect the maritime interests of Japan.

It was the Admiral's belief that, if war should be declared, his enemies, rather than risk a naval battle, would allow him time enough to leave Liaotung to start an Odyssey across the Pacific to the coast of South America. If Japan should desire to press the war against Germany (and it was his conviction that she would not), the strong anti-Japanese

feeling in the United States would militate against pursuit from portions of her fleet into the Pacific.

The Admiral was perfectly correct in his conjectures. Spee was allowed two weeks to withdraw from Liaotung but he chose to depart with his squadron in several days. Only when the Germans had withdrawn was it deemed safe for elements of the Japanese Navy to begin laying a blockade around the peninsula.

Spee began his long jaunt across the Pacific and the British began to give chase. The Japanese Naval Ministry, making a pretense of keeping the treaty alliance with Great Britain, allowed a battle cruiser, the *Kongō*, to join the pursuit. The Japanese government, however, was indifferent in its support of the chase. The best battleships and cruisers were kept close to the home bases to more effectively carry out Togo's designs on Germany's territorial possessions.

At the time Spee's squadron swooped down on the British squadron of Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile at Coronel, the Japanese Naval Ministry had contributed a few more vessels to the Anglo-British squadron. Together the Allies formed cordons in order to prevent the German Admiral from breaking back into the Pacific. The combined squadron consisted of H.M.S. *Newcastle*, and the Japanese vessels the *Idzumo*, the *Hizen*, *Asoma*, *Kurona Tsukuba*, *Iwate* and the *Ritvizan*. One of these ships was a battle-weary vessel of the Russo-Japanese War. None of them were swift enough and strong enough to effectively pursue the enemy.

After Von Spee had successfully and strategically smashed Admiral Cradock's fleet he began to steam southward in the direction of Cape Horn. Once the German Admiral rounded the Horn he hoped to successfully evade the British fleet and strike out for Germany. The British Admiralty, aroused over the disaster at Coronel, dispatched two ships from the North Sea to assist elements of Britain's Atlantic fleet in tracking down Von Spee. The hunters were successful and after a vicious chase and a hard fought battle, Von Spee's squadron with the exception of one ship was dispatched to a watery grave. The defeated Admiral went down to his death on his flag ship.

The Japanese naval ships in the Pacific did not venture around the Horn to assist their

British allies. For a short time they maintained a watchful position in the Pacific. After the defeat of the German squadron at the battle of the Falklands they moved back closer to their home bases. The token gestures by which they had carried out their alliance with the British had been fulfilled.

Shortly after Von Spee's raiders left the Far Eastern waters for the long jaunt across the Pacific, Japan proceeded to reduce the German stronghold of Tsingtao on the bay of Kiaochow. For years Japan had coveted this foothold on the mainland of China. Now unmolested by any other power, she proceeded to take the prized possession in a joint operation of both army and naval forces.

This naval force was commanded by Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. At the great victorious battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War he had been Admiral Togo's chief of staff. Now with his own independent command he still continued to serve his superior by carrying out his plan of stripping Germany of her acquired possession and establishing Japanese sovereignty on the mainland of Asia.

The task force proceeded to sweep mines and lay an effective blockade off the coast of Tsingtao. While this was happening on the sea, a Japanese division under the command of Lieutenant General Kamio commenced a landing at Lungkow, 150 miles north of Tsingtao. Despite terrible weather conditions, this division was joined by a second Japanese contingent which landed at Laoshan Bay. The combined forces advanced and were successful in taking several of the forward positions of the Germans. A British force consisting of 910 officers and men of the 2nd South Wales Borderers and 450 men of the 36th Sikhs now joined the Japanese. The Allied armies moved in on the forts at Tsingtao, defended by 13,000 men, of which there were 5,599 German regular army troops.

As the army moved in by land, Tomasuburo's naval squadron closed in by sea, hurling a continuous bombardment on the German forts of Moltke, Bismark and Iltis. The next morning all three forts were flying the white flags of surrender.

Some historians have maintained that the taking of Tsingtao was an easy campaign for the Japanese. The evidence in the light of the losses and the casualties would indicate otherwise. The Japanese army lost 1,968 men killed

or wounded. The naval losses were a cruiser, a destroyer and a torpedo boat. However, the gain of a strong base on the continent made these losses seem insignificant.

While the operations were progressing against Tsingtao, British naval contingents took the German colonial possessions of Micronesia and Polynesia from New Guinea to Samoa. An Australian naval force added the Solomon, Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands which Germany bought from Spain in 1899. A supporting Japanese fleet, quick to act, moved in and took possession of several of the islands in the Marianas and the Carolines. The strategic importance of these islands was that they provided bases for submarines and airplanes which in the future would thrust Japanese naval and aerial power eastward into the Pacific, cutting the communication lines between the Philippines and Hawaii.

The conquest of Tsingtao was effected with little regard for China. The Japanese government did not ask the permission of China to cross the Shantung Peninsula. Japan also let it be known to China that the Imperial Government would be opposed to China's declaring war on Germany in order to get back Tsingtao and the territory the Japanese seized in Shantung.

Furthermore, Japan presented China with an ultimatum containing twenty-one demands. The substance of this document revealed that Japan planned to use her territorial conquests as a means of establishing a protectorate over China. Despite Japan's insistence on secrecy the President of China, Yuan Shih-Kai, dared to let the terms of the ultimatum leak out.

Japan's designs on the continent of Asia were softened when they became known to the world. Allowing for the opposition of the United States, the Japanese government acknowledged by note that some of the demands were only requests. Nevertheless in her previous negotiations with China she insisted that a request was just as important as a demand.

In answer to the Japanese note, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan declared that the United States could not recognize any agreement that impaired the treaty rights of the United States or any of its citizens in China. This portion of the note was merely a reaffirmation of the traditional "Open Door Policy." Due to his pacifist leanings and because he did not want to antagonize Japan, the Secretary of

State added an ambiguous statement to the note. He stated that he realized "territorial contiguity" created "special relations" between Japan and the district of Shantung. This placed the Japanese government in a position to attach the broadest interpretation possible to the clause. Not only was Shantung included in the sphere of "special relations" but the areas of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia as well.

The clause "special relations" gave Japan the green light to wield a free hand in Asia. In order to solidify her position on the continent Japan made a secret treaty with Russia to guarantee permanent peace in China and to safeguard China from the political domination of any third power. When the Russian archives were looted in 1918 by the Bolsheviks, it was revealed that the third power was very definitely the United States, with the possibility of Great Britain as an ally. According to terms of the treaty the Russians expected an armed conflict between the United States and Japan before the summer of 1921.

Japan took special advantage of the entry of the United States in the war to send Viscount Kikujure Ishui to Washington. The envoy was given the special task of getting the United States to officially recognize Japan's China policy. It was necessary to obtain such recognition before the United States built up a mighty wartime fleet. Officials of the Japanese government believed that with such a fleet the United States could prove a formidable threat to Japanese expansion on the mainland of China. If however recognition could be obtained of Japan's right to move into Shantung then the Oriental Power would have achieved a diplomatic triumph.

Viscount Ishui conferred with Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing was not only hampered by Bryan's recognition of Japan's "special rights" on the mainland of China, but also by the envoy's repeated suggestion that Japan might make a separate peace with Germany. The Secretary, therefore, made a cautiously phrased agreement. His policy was to be regretted by his successors in office.

The Lansing-Ishui agreement reaffirmed Japan's "special interests" in China. The Secretary of State did attempt to insert a clause which would guarantee the integrity of China and which would not abridge the rights and privileges of its citizens or the citizens of other

nations in China. This open clause was unacceptable to the Japanese envoy so a secret protocol was drawn up which stated that the principle of the open clause, which was suppressed, was in complete accord with the declared policy of the two governments in regard to China.

This merely added to the ambiguity of the agreement. Japan later interpreted the secret protocol to the Chinese in words that meant paramount interests instead of special interests. Ishui was well contented with his diplomatic victory, which twenty years later was used as a precedent to attack outright both Manchuria and China.

If Lansing created a problem for the future, he must have been conscious of the very weak defenses of the United States in the Pacific in 1917. When the twenty-one demands were served upon China the United States was unable to enforce single-handed any policy against Japan. The United States' island possessions in the Pacific and all the defenses on these islands were wide open to attack. At the outset of the first World War, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was obliged to tell the cabinet of President Woodrow Wilson that the U. S. Navy was inadequate to protect the Philippines, Hawaii or Alaska.

Japan now had the Pacific to herself. Why she did not attack when the U.S. and British navies were absorbed in the struggle with Germany on the Atlantic is a matter for speculation. Perhaps she thought that her position at that time was not strong enough for her to take such a chance.

Though Japan kept her battle fleet in home waters she did send units of her fleet into the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea for convoy duty. The cruiser and destroyer divisions under the command of Admiral Saito in the Mediterranean received praise and commendations for their valuable assistance. An Admiral of the Royal Navy described the Japanese as gluttons for work.

Here again Japan's motives were purely selfish ones. When she gave this assistance, the war in Europe was going against the Allies. The desperate situation occasioned by Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on the eve of the entry of the United States in the war gave Japan the opportunity to secure valuable pledges. In return for Japanese assistance Britain, France and Italy agreed

to recognize Japan's claims to Shantung and the German islands above the equator.

With the backing of the aforementioned powers, Japan came into legal possession of the German-held islands at the Peace Conference in Paris. President Woodrow Wilson consented to the agreement, provided of course that Japan submit to a theoretical and unenforceable mandate of the League of Nations. From that time Japan stood in a position to sever the communications between Hawaii and the Philippines whenever it became necessary to do so. The road to Pearl Harbor was cleared of all obstacles. Because the Japanese gained such concessions in World War I it was impossible for General MacArthur's forces to be reinforced in the Philippines in the intervening weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

At the end of World War I the policies advocated by Admiral Togo at the beginning of the struggle had to a great extent been realized. Japan first of all had carved out for herself strategic bases in the Pacific. She extended her influence into China by hoodwinking the United States in the Lansing-Ishui agreement. War orders from Europe had enabled her to build up her industries. Her merchant fleet had benefited from the carrying trade of the war. Last and most important of all she had the opportunity to build a fleet that in time would challenge the combined British and United States naval forces for the supremacy of the Pacific.

Admiral Togo died before the final phases of the plan were carried into effect. He died perhaps with the satisfaction that his ideas would continue to guide Japan's destiny in the Pacific. It was his dead hand that launched Japan on the fatal road to Pearl Harbor.

The Correlation of American History With Economics

DON A. SMITH

Ferndale, Michigan

Among the many objectives of the history teacher is that of helping the pupils to appreciate the past and to understand the present. Since a basic knowledge of our economics is paramount in the understanding of our American society, the integration of American history and our economic structure should be a part of our course of study. This integrated program may and should be carried on under either a chronological or a strictly problem approach to the teaching of history.

If history is to be a tool used in the understanding of the present, it becomes evident that only that history should be taught which can be used in interpreting and appreciating our society of today. A study of Alexander Hamilton's financial plans is of little or no value unless the teacher can use it to help pupils understand our economy. Likewise a study of the inflation of the Revolutionary War or Civil War can be justified only if it can be used to help to appreciate our problem of in-

flation today. From these two statements it may be concluded that economic history must be used, if used at all, in showing how and why our present economy came into being and also how economic factors brought about the settlement and growth of our country.

Anthropologists generally agree that it was economic pressure which brought the Indians and Eskimos to the Western Hemisphere. It was likewise true that economic pressure brought Leif Ericson, Columbus, Magellan, Cartier, Cabot, Hudson and others to America. Finally, as North America became settled, the quest for homes made it possible for the English to drive out the less numerous Frenchmen who had come only to seek furs and Christian converts.

America was settled by Europeans seeking freedom from poverty as well as freedom of religion. Whether French or English, Dutch or Swedish, these settlers brought their old social customs and economic ways of living to

America. Thus a little of Europe was transplanted to America. Gradually, the intermingling of these Europeans with one another as well as with the Indians brought about an exchange of ideas so that only the best practices came to be used. It was also found that many of the old practices, which were good enough to be used in the Old World, would not work at all in America. Captain John Smith's experiment with a communistic society had to be abandoned. As the colonists began to understand the full meaning of their new freedom, they began to break away from their old economic traditions. New economic problems arose. Instead of there being too many people, as in Europe, it was found that America had too few people. The guild system proved inadequate. Indentured servants and slaves were introduced to meet the labor shortage. The free working man was able either to bargain for a wage or to work for himself rather than serve as a serf as he had in Europe and in America under the patroon system. As more and more land was cleared and machines were invented, our farmers could use extensive methods of farming.

During the Revolutionary War two events took place which eventually brought about momentous changes in our social and economic life. First, the Declaration of Independence was written, which gave the common man a new dignity. As time passed Americans came to understand the Jeffersonian philosophy in this great document, and with this understanding came an ever increasing economic freedom. Second, the westward movement which started during this period brought about a new and richer appreciation of the rights of man. As the pioneer crossed the Appalachians, he left behind his European traditions. On the frontier it was found that the man who could wield an ax or help a sick neighbor was more in need than the man with money in his pockets or a man who boasted a fine ancestry. Thus, the system of serfdom, indentured servants, and slavery gave way to the free worker with political rights.

The job of the history teacher is to teach these economic concepts and changes so vitally that they become a part of the thinking of the students. Since Alexander Hamilton developed the economic principles which our country used

for over a century, it would be well to see how Hamiltonian philosophy emerged so as to become the basis of our present economy. In organizing the presentation of Hamilton's plans to the history class it is necessary to consider first the problems of motivation and introduction.

The film "Land of Liberty," Reel I, is of great value in stimulating pupil interest in money and the many other aspects of our economy. Discussion of this film can lead to an understanding of money and banking, supply and demand, production and consumer, workers and wages, savings and investments, and the need for wise government regulation. Since the film depicts people with money unable to buy and people with goods unable to sell, it never fails to stimulate interest. At the same time it helps pupils to formulate some very basic economic questions. By reviewing and analyzing the mercantile theory of trade pupils can not only see its fallacy but also understand our present economic concepts. An example of some of the questions which would be raised by the pupils as a result of this introduction are:

1. What is money?
2. What is supply and demand?
3. What is a tariff?
4. What happens when the consumer is unable to buy?
5. Is it necessary to have money in order to exchange goods?

Additional motivation of the value of money may be attained by showing the class an inflated currency such as a Confederate bill or a German mark of 1922. Having sufficiently aroused interest and defined certain new words in the vocabulary, the class should proceed to find answers to their questions. Teacher guidance is needed to see that all aspects of the problem are covered. Special care should be taken to make sure that each pupil is working on an aspect of the problem in which he is most interested and in which he can progress at his own level. Among the many activities which could be carried on by the pupils are the following:

1. Make a cartoon on the whisky tax.
2. Make a bar graph comparing wages and prices in the United States and England in 1790 and 1956.

3. Make a graph showing the percentage of country dwellers in 1800, 1850, 1900, and 1950.
4. Collect newspaper clippings which deal with the tariff and world trade.
5. Collect newspaper clippings which deal with money problems.
6. Imagine you were living in 1790 and write a letter to a friend describing Hamilton's financial policies.
7. Make an oral report to the class explaining why some of Hamilton's ideas are no longer used today.
8. Make a list of items such as meat, flour, eggs, and butter and show what they cost in 1800, in 1850, and in 1956. (See Well's *Economic History of the United States*, page 12 for help.)
9. Collect pictures of advertised items which are made in foreign countries.
10. Make a cutout showing what a dollar would buy in 1800, 1860, and 1956.
11. Make a cutout showing what an hour's wages would buy in 1800, 1860, and 1950. (See Well's *Economic History* for help.)
12. Make a picture of items which we could buy more cheaply from foreign countries if there were no tariffs.
13. Make a picture or cutout of things which we must buy from foreign countries.
14. Make two clocks, one showing the number of hours people worked in 1800, clock two showing the hours worked today.
15. Represent on a bar graph the percentage of work done by horses, man and machines in 1850, 1900, and 1950.
16. Make a picture of some item such as a house or automobile and show what it would cost in 1933 as compared with what it would cost today.
17. Make a pie graph showing the percentage of worker's wages which were spent on luxuries in 1830. Do the same showing what the worker of today spends for luxuries.
18. Make a line graph showing the cycles of prosperity and depression from 1789 to 1956.
19. Make an oral report to the class on our first tariff law. Compare it with our tariff policy of today.
20. Make a cartoon showing what would happen

if tariffs were so high that there could be no trade between nations.

Following is a bibliography which will help students to solve some of the above problems. Coman, Katherine: *Industrial History of the United States*, pp. 132-140, 141-146.

Compton's *Pictured Encyclopaedia*, Vol. II, pp. 39-45; Vol. III, pp. 393-394; Vol. XIV, pp. 13-15.

Dewey, D. R.: *Financial History of the United States*, pp. 80-127, 139-161, 198-210, 298-476.

Kemmerer, E. W.: *The ABC of the Federal Reserve System*, pp. 1-92.

Sumner, W. G.: *American Currency*, pp. 50-75.

Wells, Louis Ray: *Economic History of the United States*, pp. 113-129, 224-225, 446-463.

White, Horace: *Money and Banking*, pp. 60-78, 125-264, 348-360, 401-415, 425-452.

World Book, Vol. II, pp. 641-644, Vol. XVI, pp. 7890-7893.

The period of assimilation should include field trips, film strips, and movies as well as reading, reports, and projects. It is in guiding and helping pupils in discussing these experiences that the teacher should play a guiding role if group dynamics are to prevail. Teacher explanations should not become teacher lectures. Problems should be so presented that the pupils themselves should find their own answers through teacher guidance. See the accompanying discussion guides for further clarification of this point.

Filmstrips, field trips, local businessmen, charts, television, radio, and movies should all play an important part in the development of economic understandings. Film distributors are continually increasing their visual aid materials. Opaque projectors are of great help in making it possible to focus the attention of a large group upon a graph or chart for interpretation.

Altogether too often visual aids are not used, and the excuse given is that they are too costly. From the point of view of the results achieved this argument is fallacious. It has been proven that visual aids properly used save time in teaching certain concepts, and they stimulate student interest. Pupils retain what they learn longer. Where school budgets are

limited, there are many filmstrips and movies which may be obtained free of charge or at a very nominal fee. For example, the New York Stock Exchange has a filmstrip which is free to all schools. The "Dupont Story," "The American Crossroads," and the "Miracle of Rubber" are only a few of hundreds of free available films. The *Educators' Guide to Free Films* is a publication by the Education Progress Service in Randolph, Wisconsin which lists both free filmstrips and movies.

In answer to the problem of using community resources in helping to teach economic concepts, it is first necessary to survey these resources. Too many times a wealth of local help is available but not used. Local industrialists, bankers, insurance men, and union leaders are generally glad to help by giving talks, co-operating in field trips, and supplying materials.

When the class approaches the point where interest and enthusiasm are beginning to lag, it is time to make some generalizations and then proceed to another topic. However, the economic principles learned will have a way of reappearing in other studies of the labor movement, depressions, industrial expansion, and so on. Let us make our teaching so vital that it will be used by the adults of tomorrow to create a better world in which to live.

DISCUSSION GUIDE IN TEACHING THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION

4,000	2,000	1,000	500	250	125	62½	31¼
\$25	\$50	\$1	\$2	\$4	\$8	\$16	\$32
\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000

1. Let us assume that a wheat farmer needs to borrow \$1,000 to buy a tractor. Since wheat is selling for \$1.00 a bushel, how many bushels would he need to raise in order to pay back the debt?
2. What would happen to the price of wheat if more money were placed in circulation?
3. Suppose that enough money was placed in circulation to increase the price of wheat to \$2.00 a bushel. How many bushels of wheat would the farmer need to raise in order to pay back his \$1,000 debt?
4. If the dollar were inflated so that wheat sold for \$4.00 a bushel, how many bushels of wheat would the farmer need to raise to pay his debt?
5. Who is helped by inflation? Who is harmed by inflation?

6. Now let us suppose that instead of more money being put into circulation after the farmer borrowed \$1,000 money was taken out of circulation. What would happen to the price of wheat?
7. Suppose that enough money is taken out of circulation to lower the price of wheat to \$.50 a bushel. How many bushels of wheat would the farmer need to raise in order to pay his \$1,000 debt?
8. If the dollar was deflated still further so that wheat sold for \$.25 a bushel, how many bushels of wheat would the farmer need to raise in order to pay his debt?
9. Who is helped by the deflation of the dollar? How?
10. Who is injured by the deflation of the dollar? Why?
11. What kind of dollar is the best dollar to have?

DISCUSSION GUIDE IN TEACHING THE TARIFF

UNITED STATES	ENGLAND
Shoes \$10	Shoes \$6

1. Wages are higher in the United States than in England. Since this is true, in which country could you buy shoes for less money?
2. Let us assume that English shoes sell for \$6.00 per pair and U.S. shoes sell for \$10.00 per pair. What could English shoes sell for if it cost \$1.00 to ship each pair to the United States?
3. Which shoes would you then buy?
4. What effect would this purchase have upon our shoe industry?
5. Let us assume that our government placed a \$4.00 tax on each pair of shoes entering the United States. What shoes would you buy?
6. Such a tax is called a protective tariff. Why?
7. How much money would our government make on this \$4.00 tariff on shoes? Why?
8. Who is helped by this tariff? Who is harmed by this tariff?
9. Now let us assume that our government placed a \$1.00 tax on all shoes entering the country. Which shoes would you buy then? Why?
10. Such a tax is called a revenue tariff. Why?
11. Who is benefited by such a tariff? Who is hurt by this tariff?
12. Which kind of tariff is best?

The Teachers' Page

HYMAN M. BOODISH

Abraham Lincoln High School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Mr. James Minto, an exchange teacher from St. Andrews, Scotland, is spending one year in the Abraham Lincoln High School, Philadelphia, Pa. He is our guest writer for this issue of "The Teachers' Page."

We shall make a few comments on some of the things Mr. Minto says, following his contribution.

* * * * *

After the Second World War it was obvious that the main hope for the free world lay in the close alliance and the close understanding between the United States and the British Commonwealth. To further cement these relations, an exchange scheme was brought into being by the Education departments on both sides of the Atlantic, whereby each year, a hundred teachers should exchange teaching posts. Teachers are in an ideal position to pass on information and to correct misconceptions which may be prevalent. Teachers on exchange therefore have a double responsibility. First, they must find out all they can about American education, and secondly they must find out all they can about the American way of life, so that when they return they can pass on the information gleaned during the year to their classes in the future.

I am fortunate to be one of the hundred teachers on exchange this year. My home is in St. Andrews, Scotland, and I teach in Waid Academy, Anstruther, Fife. At present I am teaching in the Abraham Lincoln High School, Philadelphia, which is a tremendous contrast to the small, rural high school from which I have come. Although I am teaching English here, my subject is history and in this article I would like to describe the philosophy and aims behind Scottish education in general, and the teaching of social studies in particular.

Scotland is an old country — a country with traditions stretching back into the mists of history and it has a cultural heritage of which it is justifiably proud. Scotland's history is a stormy one and the present culture of the

people has been brought into being by revolution and radical reforms; but despite the violence of some of these changes the national character of the people and the historical traditions remain the basic elements in their development. America, on the other hand, is still in the making; her past is so short that, from the European point of view, it is part of her present, and, as yet cannot play the role of stabilizing power as in Europe. Indeed to a foreigner, the Americans appear to estimate the past as ballast in its original sense of a "worthless load", and many appear even to pride themselves on its absence. In such conditions America looks forward and believes that tomorrow is always better than today. This outlook I would imagine has been influenced by the circumstances of the first settlements, by the constantly moving frontier, and by the masses of immigrants who passionately wanted to forget their past. The first settlers fled from the persecutions of central governments in Europe because they represented a deviation from accepted traditions and thus they brought over with them a distrust of the established order and a negative attitude towards the past. The American philosophy of life and its educational system reflected the condition of American growth and tended towards pragmatism and relativism. Dewey's pragmatism gave full expression to the frontier spirit of America, and profoundly influenced the theory and practice of contemporary American education. The deviation from Europe is therefore marked, but nevertheless America is closely bound up with European culture. After all, the fundamental factors which shaped American tradition — Puritanism and Humanism — were widespread European movements, born and grown to stature in Europe. In so far as America shared this heritage, therefore, she is a part of the European cultural community and more particularly of Western Europe.

Puritanism was, and is a strong factor in Scotland's educational heritage. In the 16th

century John Knox returned to Scotland from Geneva, fired with a burning zeal to establish a theocratic state in Scotland similar to Calvin's Geneva. Thus began a period in Scottish history which was characterized by bloodshed and confusion as the Reformed Church and the State both sought power. The one bright and constructive event of this time was John Knox's production of the "First Book of Discipline" which gave rise to the first comprehensive national system of education. The revenues from the monastic lands were to be used to set up elementary schools in all the parishes of Scotland and in the towns, teachers were to be appointed "as are able to teach Grammar and Latin tongue". Although Knox's scheme was not carried out in his life time, the grandeur of the whole conception undoubtedly moulded the subsequent history of Scottish education. When it was finally established, Scotland prided itself on the democratic character of the elementary school in particular — the squire's son sat next to the blacksmith's son and appeared to be none the worse for it! As a result of these early influences one of the main tenets of our educational system is a general acceptance of the great tradition of Christian theism as regulative for our national life. This means that the sacredness and the significance of the individual is recognized and that the natural and social environment exists to promote the growth of free and rational beings. For us in Scotland then, the conclusion is inescapable that the chief end of education is to foster the full and harmonious development of the individual. It is not suggested that only on a Christian basis can such an educational doctrine be built. On the contrary, all healthy democratic thinking, as opposed to state worship, must remain unimpressed by the mere power and permanence of organized society unless in so far as it "helps to fashion desirable patterns of individual life." What may be claimed is, that such a concept of education finds in the Christian view of man its sufficient rationale and the necessary safeguards against anti-social excess or distortion.

The end of education, however, may be individual excellence, but life is led against a social background, and therefore education has a responsibility in teaching the children how to live as social beings. This aspect of education is stressed in America much more than in

Europe. In Europe the schools are content if they provide an environment of security and ordered freedom. We believe that citizenship is something which cannot be adequately taught as a distinct subject, but rather it is an attitude which is absorbed from a well run, disciplined school, where every child apart from school work, participates in games and learns self discipline. The child has to a great extent to conform to standards of behavior which are considered desirable and if he does not conform, he is forced to, by means of corporal punishment. After all, when the boy leaves school he has to conform to adult standards of behavior and unless he learns self discipline while at school, he can find himself in trouble, as soon as he has to face up to the problems of life.

We believe that for an individual pupil to achieve his full potential it is necessary to segregate the pupils as soon as they leave the elementary school. By this segregation, the Platonic idea of raising a golden class, or a class of leaders, is followed. Our senior high pupils, therefore, are all college bound pupils, although they do not all find their way to college. This group comprises pupils of an I.Q. of 110+ and they can, under this system, receive an education, which their intelligence deserves. These are the people on whom the future of the country depends, and it would be wrong not to stretch them to their full mental capacity. The pupils with I.Q.'s ranging below 110 all leave school at fifteen. Very few of this group, it is argued, would profit from further education in the equivalent of the senior high. At fifteen, however, their schooling is not quite over, because the various industries send the youngsters to trade schools which operate during working hours, as well as in the evenings. To get these pupils out of school, fully employed and earning money, helps keep the delinquency rate down.

Let us now consider the Social Studies curriculum as presented in Scotland and see how it differs from the American curriculum. In Scotland social studies means simply history and geography. The main difference is that we lay little stress on the economic side of history, whereas in America, where there is more accent on materialism than in Europe, economics plays a major part in the social studies cur-

riculum. In history, the stress is on political, social and constitutional history. It has been argued that the serious study of history must lie outside the years of compulsory schooling, because children lack the developed time sense, the broad grasp of principles, and above all the psychological understanding necessary for the causal interpretation of human life extended in time and in space. Certainly this is true of the younger children, but not, I feel of the senior pupils of the college block, who are given a course in world history which stretches them to their limit. History is taught to this group, not to acquire merely a mass of historical data, but also a technique of study, which the serious student will apply to any stretch of history, be it Scottish, British, or European. Much time is given with the utmost profit to a subject that combines the austere discipline of a science with a rich humanistic appeal. The first aim then is always the training in critical judgment and the mustering and weighing of evidence, which is the best reward of historical study and a great need of our time. This would imply intensive study of short periods of history with use of source materials. That is the ideal, but in fact, external examination requirements limit the use of such materials, and rather our senior pupils are taught the history of Britain and Europe under broad headings, and then certain periods are selected for specialized study. For example, the struggle between the Crown and Parliament may be studied through the centuries from the late middle ages, when the power lay wholly in the hands of the monarch, to the time of complete limitation in the reign of Victoria. In that broad topic, certain periods may be chosen for careful study—the Puritan opposition which began under Elizabeth, the Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, George III's attempt to regain the past power of the Crown, and Victoria's last efforts to stay the inevitable. It is essential that students know more than the history of their own country. It appears to me that in the United States the stress is almost completely on American history. The history of Europe is virtually neglected, and I feel that this is a pity. To study only America's history in detail is to lead to insularity, and a non-understanding of Europe and European problems.

The pupils who leave school at fifteen are

given an entirely different type of course. Chronological history is cut down to the minimum and the accent is on social history. For example one of the topics that this group studies is the history of ships, from the first primitive dugout to the construction of the modern liners. This method makes the child aware of time by a simpler method than by the study of political and constitutional history. Other topics, which have been discovered interesting to the pupils are the study of houses, clothes, the wheel and the knife. In the study of ships a tremendous amount of ground can be covered. From the dugout and a study of primitive man, the course moves to Ancient Egypt, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, Romans and their galleys, and the Vikings right up to the "Queen Elizabeth", and the "United States".

In the Geography course the college-bound students have a comprehensive course, which includes a study of natural regions, climatology, map reading, and a little economic geography. For the duller group, human geography is accentuated. At every stage, maps, not textbooks, are the essential instruments of geographical teaching, especially maps recording population and the location of industries. All geography courses start with a study of the local region, and with the child's growth in knowledge and understanding, the area widens to the region, that "product of the interaction of place, people and work", then to the country, with the added idea of nationhood and all the sentiment that clings to it; and finally to the whole earth, with the contrasting feelings it arouses of strangeness and of solidarity. But, however the scale may vary and the degree of detail, the guiding ideas remain the same—the interaction of man and his environment, and the ever-deepening interdependence of community and community.

The future of the free peoples of the world depends on understanding each others' problems, and these problems can only be understood if the history, geography and culture of the various democracies are studied by the children of the various nations. Therefore, I feel that it is essential that in Britain we should study more fully the history and geography of the United States, and that here in America a more complete study of Europe and its problems should be undertaken.

In Scotland, as in America, the schools more

than ever have a duty to society, because of the profound change which has come over national life in the past half century. Urbanization, limitation of families and the passing away of a closely unified family life, the immense scale and high specialization of industry and the ceaseless movement of population have transformed the relatively simple and stable community life of earlier times into a vast, incoherent complex in which the adolescent tends to be lost. It is the task then, on both sides of the Atlantic, for the school systems to try to replace in some measure what has been lost. The aim is the same, although the philosophies and resulting methods may be different.

I shall certainly take back with me to Scotland a tremendous regard, respect, and admiration for this great country, which it is my privilege to visit under such ideal circumstances.

Comments

Mr. Minto's evaluation of America (the United States) as not fully mature, as are the European nations with a longer historical heritage, raises the question concerning the relative significance of the factor of age of a country in its role as a world power. This matter of a country's maturity suggests other questions having to do with her overall cultural history — political, economic, social, religious, educational, scientific and humanistic. It further suggests questions about the relationship of the continuity of the cultural development, the gaps, the regressions, and sudden revolutionary changes, to the country's maturity. China is one of our most ancient countries. Is she by virtue of that fact a mature or immature country? And, how significant is her maturity or immaturity in her present role as a world power? The same questions pertain to Russia and India.

If we were to evaluate the degree of maturity of these three countries we would have to conclude that in terms of historical development they are very old countries. Old age of itself does not necessarily denote maturity. In terms of political and economic development these three nations are virtually infants. Yet their current impact upon world affairs is much more powerful than that of some politically mature countries. Size in terms of land area, economic wealth, natural resources, industrial

development (or its potential), population, achievements in the arts, sciences and education, and political aggressiveness (not necessarily of a destructive nature) are the factors which determine the overall impact that a country may have in international affairs. As to maturity in dealing with world problems, who is to judge when a country's behavior is mature or immature? Perhaps the real test of a nation's maturity is the extent to which its leadership in world affairs contributes to world stability. By the latter we mean more than the maintenance of the *status quo*. Embodied in this concept of stability is the elimination of those factors in international relations which are destructive to world harmony and peaceful development of all peoples. What countries today are the most mature (and influential) in providing leadership toward such stability?

On the subject of education Mr. Minto presents some very interesting concepts. We like his statement that although one of the ends of education is "individual excellence", education has the greater responsibility of "teaching children how to live as social beings." He feels that in our country this aspect of education is stressed more than in Europe where "the schools are content if they provide an environment of security and ordered freedom." We like that phrase very much — an environment of security and ordered freedom!

We subscribe to Mr. Minto's concept of citizenship as "something which cannot be adequately taught as a distinct subject, but rather it is an attitude which is absorbed." We believe, though, that it takes more than "a well run, disciplined school" (important as this is) to develop citizenship. Effective citizenship is a constellation of attitudes and ways of thinking and behaving which are absorbed from everything around us, including the school. The latter is an agency which, under favorable circumstances, can enlarge upon, refine and give direction to citizenship development.

Mr. Minto's contrast of the American concept of the social studies with that of Scotland, in terms of curriculum offerings, will please teachers who feel that we have been neglecting the teaching of history and geography. Others will applaud also his statement that our schools tend to be provincial in their stress on American and state history and their neglect of world

Malaya Federation, its people, their way of life, and their industries.

The Story of Television. 27 min. Free-loan. Institute of Visual Training, 40 E. 49 St., New York 17, N. Y.

Film traces the progress of TV from its inception and spectacular growth across the nation to the present development and major expansion of the color television era.

Production 5118. 30 min. Free-loan, except for return postage charges. Modern Talking Picture Service, Inc., 3 E. 45 St., New York 22, N. Y.

The film's theme treats the broad problem of communication as it exists between individuals and groups in any life situation. It makes no pretension to being the final answer to the problem of human understanding. The film challenges the individual to measure his own ideas and opinions in relation to the viewpoints of others.

An American Miracle. 22 min. Sound. Free-loan. Public Relations Staff, Film Library, General Motors Corp., General Motors Bldg., Detroit 2, Mich.

You get a behind-the-scenes-look at the many steps required in mass producing a single product.

Refining Oil for Energy. 20 min. Color. Free-loan. Film Division, Shell Oil Co., 50 W. 50 St., New York 20, N. Y.

Tells how refineries transform crude oil into finished products.

Miracle of Rubber. 20 min. Color. Free-loan. Association Films, 347 Madison Ave., New York 20, N. Y.

Presents the manufacture of natural and synthetic rubber.

The Drama of Steel. 34 min. Sound. B&W. Free-loan. U.S. Bureau of Mines, 4800 Forbes St., Pittsburgh 13, Pa.

The history of steel making and the production steps from mine through mill to finished products is vividly depicted.

Ganges River. 16 min. Sound. Color or B&W. Sale. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Text Film Dept., 330 W. 42 St., New York 36, N. Y.

Traces route and history of the river from its source; covers irrigation, major cities, education, industry. Shows also, American technical aid, harbor of Calcutta, delta regions, and the river's religious significance.

Mooti . . . Child of New India. 15 min. Sound. Color or B&W. Sale or rental. Atlantis Productions, P. O. Box 46216, Hollywood 46, Calif.

Tells the story of a Hindu boy who takes part in changing India; his life—at school, at home, at play, and at work.

Alaska — A Modern Frontier. 10 min. Color or B&W. Sale. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc., 1150 Wilmette Ave., Wilmette, Ill.

Shows scenes of industries, people, transportation and geographical features; maps and globes illustrate its position, size and strategic importance.

Alaska, Global Crossroads. 11 min. Color or B&W. Sale or rental. Association Films.

Alaska in the air age is surveyed along with its industries, peoples and problems.

FILMSTRIPS

India. 59 frames. Sale *Life Magazine*, Filmstrip Division, 9 Rockefeller Pl., New York 20, N. Y.

Depicts the progress of 400 million people from famine and poverty to modern agriculture, industry, and education.

India's Many Faces. 59 frames. *New York Times*, Office of Educational Activities, 229 W. 43 St., New York 36, N. Y.

India today is seen in conflict with Pakistan, her economic progress, her gods, and her many faces.

India, The Land and Its People. 39 frames. Color. Sale. Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14, Ill.

Seen are landscapes, architecture, industries, customs, activities, and interests of people; points out differences in culture, and compares customs, dress, and crafts.

Eskimo Sea Hunters — Northwestern Alaska (Earth and Its Peoples Series). 46 frames. United World Films, Inc., Educational Film Dept., 1445 Park Ave., New York 29, N. Y.

Depicts the daily life of an Eskimo settlement along the shores of the Arctic Ocean.

Alaska. 70 frames. Sale. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc.

Reviews Alaska's geographical features and chief climatic regions; indicates vast untapped resources of the territory, scenes of lumbering, mining, fur farming, and agriculture.

and European history. It may be recalled that the National Council of Social Studies recently expressed a similar view. Part of our difficulty lies perhaps in our unwillingness or hesitancy to admit *openly* that not all students can profit from the same social studies curriculum. Although we do differentiate between the less and more capable students with respect to the kinds of *high school* programs offered to them, we do

expect *all* students to take the same social studies courses. Perhaps we need to provide different courses in the social studies, with different goals and objectives, and with different content, for boys and girls whose basic abilities and overall interests are significantly different in terms of their educational goals. In practice some of this, of course, is already being done, but in a camouflaged way.

Visual and Other Aids

IRWIN A. ECKHAUSER

Washington Junior High School, Mt. Vernon, New York

Stanley Bowmar Co. Inc., 12 Cleveland Street, Valhalla, N. Y. announces the release of a new Educational Record Catalog (8R) and a new Filmstrip Supplement (7A). The Record Catalog includes the latest in rhythm, singing game and square and folk dance albums as well as social study and literature records. The filmstrip supplement includes the latest filmstrip releases, and together with Catalog #7 (still available) covers all subjects with over 3,000 titles. Catalogs and supplements are available free to teachers and school administrators.

Young America Films, Inc., 18 E. 41 St., New York 17, N. Y., has released a new set of science filmstrips especially designed for elementary schools, under the title, *Plants and Animal Series*. Information on these is available free.

A wall map in color (22 x 37) showing how the world's resources are used in making a modern automobile is available free from the Public Relations Dept., Automobile Manufacturers' Association, 320 New Center Bldg., Detroit 2, Mich. Employing symbols representing more than 60 products consumed by the auto industry the map should be especially useful in teaching about geography and international trade or in emphasizing the interdependence of nations and peoples.

Arrangements have been completed for schools to have access to a wide variety of features shown on "Omnibus", the 90 minute television show. All sales and distribution rights are handled by Text-Film Dept., McGraw Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42 St., New York 36, N. Y. Available now are:

FILMS

The Constitution.

A three-part series narrated by the prominent Boston attorney, Joseph N. Welch, visualizes the Founding Fathers' concept of government in One Nation, One Nation Indivisible, and Liberty and Justice for All.

The Lincoln Series.

This five-part feature, widely acclaimed for its sensitive interpretation of the young Lincoln, was filmed in the actual locale where the martyred President spent his youth. It includes, *The End and the Beginning*, *Nancy Hanks, Growing Up*, *New Salem*, and *Ann Rutledge*.

FILMS

The Roman Wall. 1 reel. 11 min. Sound. Color or B&W. Sale or rental. Coronet Films, Inc., Coronet Bldg., Chicago, Ill.

Today, nearly 1600 years after the last Roman soldier left it, much of Hadrian's wall in England still remains. An examination of this 73 mile long structure, with its forts, mile-castles, turrets, barracks, and storehouses, reveals much that was characteristic of both the strength and weakness of the Roman Empire.

Crusade for Freedom. 14 min. Sound. Free-loan. *Crusade for Freedom*, 345 E. 46 St., New York 17, N. Y.

Many of the scenes are taken from a Russian movie which gives a twisted picture of life in America. Shows pictures, also, of Radio Free Europe's 29 broadcasting stations in West Germany and Portugal.

This Is Malaya. 13 min. Sound. Color or B&W. Sale or rental. British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Pl., New York 20, N. Y.

Here is background information about the

Book Reviews and Book Notes

DAVID W. HARR

Head, Department of Social Studies, Abraham Lincoln High School, Philadelphia, Pa.

American Social Legislation. By Hogan and Lanni. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. Pp. xv, 440. \$4.00.

American Social Legislation is a timely and comprehensive study. It fills a great need. It is authoritative, well written and well organized. This book brings together a great wealth of relevant materials, including excellent references and research findings. The unique way the material is organized lends itself especially to its use as a source book, and the scope and coverage of specific items make it excellent resource material for the fields of Social Work—Economics, Sociology and Law. The students of Social Legislation, Economics, and Social Problems and Social Work and the Law will enjoy the wealth of reported research material. The book may be read in its entirety or in part by economists, sociologists, students of government, lawyers and judges (especially those dealing with child and family legislation) and social workers.

In Parts I and II the enlightening and refreshing point of view links social values with the generally thought of "dry and stereotyped field of legislation," and focuses vigorous and dynamic concepts on the historical development of Social Thought—American Culture Pattern and Social Legislation, and Political Powers and Social Legislation.

Part III, Family Legislation, is especially meaningful for the many social work fields of practice.

Parts IV and V are well documented analyses of the Labor Movement and Labor Law, Social Assistance and Social Insurance. Part VI rounds out the subject of American Legislation with a particularly sensitive analysis of Social legislation and the individual. The concept is best expressed in the words of the authors: "the reader will have realized that education for specific achievements is an answer to many questionable aspects of social legislation. If people presently abuse unem-

ployment-insurance benefits, it is high time that the school systems orient their programs to the inculcation of values which would prevent such behaviors. The same is no less true of the homes of the nation. If people would be distraught over the failure of a more fully planned economy than we now have to respond to their separate idiosyncrasies, then we should spread somewhat more widely the principles of consumer buymanship and point out the costs of present adjustments in an economy left to its own devices. The point is clear: there is no insuperable barrier to the employment of knowledge to make certain that goals upon which we can all agree are achieved."

ANNIE LAURIE MCELHENIE

University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland

Sociology: The Study of Human Relations. By Arnold M. Rose. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. Pp. xv, 589, xx. Text, \$6.00; trade, \$8.00.

The list of new texts for the college introductory sociology course has here an excellent addition. Interestingly written, it steers a middle course between the older unadorned texts and the newer flashy, "gimmicky" ones, with their outsized dimensions and double columns. Green proposes that students need a general theoretical framework that gives a point of view, not a mass of research findings and scientific techniques. Hence, he cites relatively few research studies, but weaves sociological data into all the discussion. Likewise, he insists upon *sociological* theory, not a modified version of anthropology, psychology, or general "social science." Hence, the small space devoted to culture, for example. Most of the basic sociological concepts are dealt with somewhere, though not in so systematic or specific a fashion as some teachers will wish. The large areas of sociology are considered on rather equal terms, in order to give an introduction to the whole field. These major areas are: